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Abstract
We provide a generic transformation from any affine message authentication code (MAC) to an
identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme over pairing groups of prime order. If the MAC satisfies
a security notion related to unforgeability against chosen-message attacks and, for example, the k-
Linear assumption holds, then the resulting IBE scheme is adaptively secure. Our security reduction
is tightness preserving, i.e., if the MAC has a tight security reduction so has the IBE scheme. Fur-
thermore, the transformation also extends to hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). We also
show how to construct affine MACs with a tight security reduction to standard assumptions. This,
among other things, provides the first tightly secure HIBE in the standard model.
Keywords: IBE, HIBE, standard model, tight reduction
1 Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [26] enables a user to encrypt to a recipient’s identity id (e.g., an email or
phone number), and decryption can be done using a user secret key for id, obtained by a trusted authority.
The first instantiations of an IBE scheme were given in 2001 [8, 5, 25]. Whereas earlier constructions
relied on the random oracle model, the first adaptively secure construction in the standard model was
proposed in [28]. Here adaptive security means that an adversary may select the challenge identity id∗
after seeing the public key and arbitrarily many user secret keys for identities of his choice. The concept
of IBE generalizes naturally to hierarchical IBE (HIBE). In an L-level HIBE, hierarchical identities are
vectors of identities of maximal length L and user secret keys for a hierarchical identity can be delegated.
An IBE is simply a L-level HIBE with L = 1.
In this work we focus on adaptively secure (H)IBE schemes in the standard model. The construction
from [28] has the disadvantage of a non-tight security reduction, i.e., the security reduction reducing
security of the L-level HIBE to the hardness of the underlying assumption loses at least a factor of QL,
where Q is the maximal number of user secret key queries. Modern HIBE schemes [27, 7] only lose a
factor Q, independent of L. The first tightly secure IBE was recently proposed by Chen and Wee [7] but
designing a L-level HIBE for L > 1 and a tight (i.e., independent of Q) security reduction to a standard
assumption remains an open problem.
Until now, all known constructions of (H)IBE schemes are specific, i.e., they are custom-made to
a specific hardness assumption. This is in contrast to other basic cryptographic primitives such as
signatures and public-key encryption, for which efficient generic transformations have been known for a
long time. We would like to highlight the concept of smooth projective hash proof systems for chosen-
ciphertext secure encryption [10] and an old construction by Bellare and Goldwasser [2] that transforms
any pseudorandom function (PRF) plus a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof into a signature
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scheme. Until today no generic construction of a (H)IBE from any “simple” low-level cryptographic
primitive is known. However, the recent IBE scheme by Chen and Wee [7] uses a specific randomized
PRF at the core of their construction, but its usage is non-modular.
1.1 This work
Affine MACs. In this work we put forward the notion of affine message authentication codes (affine
MACs). An affine MAC over Znq is a randomized MAC with a special algebraic structure over some group
G = 〈g〉 of prime-order q. For a vector a ∈ Znq , define [a] := ga = (ga1 , . . . , gan)> ∈ Gn as the implicit
representation of a over G. Roughly speaking, the MAC tag τm = ([t], [u]) of an affine MAC over Znq
on message m ∈ M is split into a random message-independent part [t] ∈ Gn plus a message-depending
affine part [u] ∈ G satisfying
u =
∑
fi(m)x
>
i · t+
∑
f ′i(m)x
′
i ∈ Zq, (1)
where fi, f ′i :M→ Zq are public functions and xi ∈ Znq , x′i ∈ Zq are from the secret key skMAC. Almost
all group-based MACs recently considered in [11], as well as the MAC derived from the randomized
Naor-Reingold PRF [23] implicitly given in [7] are affine.
From Affine MACs to IBE. Let us fix (possibly symmetric) pairing groups G1,G2,GT equipped with
a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT . Let Dk-MDDH be any Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption [12]∗ that
holds in G1, e.g., k-Linear or DDH.
Our main result is a generic transformation IBE[MACn,Dk] from any affine message authentication
code MACn over Znq into an IBE scheme. If MACn (defined over G2) is PR-CMA-secure (pseudorandom
against chosen message attacks, a decisional variant of the standard UF-CMA security for MACs) and the
Dk-MDDH assumption holds in G1, then IBE[MACn,Dk] is an adaptively secure (and anonymous) IBE
scheme. Furthermore, the security reduction of IBE[MACn,Dk] is as tight as the one of MACn. The size of
the public IBE parameters depends on the size of the MAC secret key skMAC, whereas the IBE ciphertexts
and user secret keys always contain n+ k + 1 group elements. We stress that our transformation works
with any k ≥ 1 and any Dk-MDDH Assumption, hence Dk can be chosen to match the security assumption
of MACn.
We also extend our generic transformation to HIBE schemes. In particular, we have two generic
HIBE constructions depending on different properties of the underlying affine MACs. If the affine MAC
is delegatable (to be defined in Section 5.1), we obtain an adaptively secure L-level HIBE HIBE[MACn,Dk].
Furthermore, if the affine MAC is delegatable and anonymity-preserving (to be defined in Section 5.5), we
obtain an anonymous and adaptively secure L-level HIBE AHIBE[MACn,Dk]. Both of the constructions
have the same tightness properties as the MAC, and their ciphertexts sizes are the same as in the IBE
case. Due to different delegation methods, AHIBE[MACn,Dk] has slightly shorter public parameters, but
larger user secret keys than HIBE[MACn,Dk].
Let us highlight again the fact that the underlying object is a symmetric primitive (a MAC) that
we transform to an asymmetric primitive (an IBE scheme). Furthermore, as a MAC is a very simple
and well-understood object, we hope that our transformation can contribute to understanding the more
complex object of an IBE scheme.
Two Delegatable Affine MACs. To instantiate our transformations, we consider two specific dele-
gatable affine MACs. Our first construction, MACNR[Dk], is a generalization of the MAC derived from the
randomized Naor-Reingold PRF [7] to any Dk-MDDH Assumption. (Unfortunately, the MAC based on
the original deterministic Naor-Reingold PRF is not affine.) We show that it is affine over Znq with n = k
and delegatable. We prove PR-CMA-security with an (almost) tight security reduction to Dk-MDDH.
(Almost tight, as the security reduction loses a factor O(m), where m is the length of the message space.)
This leads to the first HIBE with a tight security reduction to a standard assumption. Ciphertexts and
user secret keys of HIBE[MACNR[Dk],Dk] only contain 2k + 1 group elements which is 3 in case we use
∗The Dk-MDDH assumption over G1 captures naturally all subspace decisional assumptions over prime order groups.
Concretely, it states that given [A]1 ∈ G(k+1)×k, the value [A ·w]1 ∈ Gk+11 is pseudorandom, where A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq gets
chosen according to distribution Dk and w ∈ Zkq . Examples include k-Linear and DDH (k = 1).
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Scheme |pk| |usk| |C| Anon. Loss Assumption
Wat05 [28] (4 + λ)|G1| 2|G2| 2|G1| – O(λQ) DBDH
Wat09 [27] 12|G1|+ |GT | 8|G2|+ |Zq| 9|G1|+ |Zq| – O(Q) 2-LIN
Lew12 [19] 24|G1|+ |GT | 6|G2| 6|G1| √ O(Q) 2-LIN
CLL+12 [6] 8|G1|+ |GT | 4|G2| 4|G1| – O(Q) SXDH
JR13 [16] 6|G1|+ |GT | 5|G2| 3|G1|+ |Zq| – O(Q) SXDH
CW13 [7] 2k2(2λ+ 1)|G1|+ k|GT | 4k|G2| 4k|G1| – O(λ) k-LIN
IBEHPS (3k
2 + 4k)|G1| (2k + 2)|G2| (2k + 2)|G1| √ O(Q) k-LIN
IBENR (2λk
2 + 2k)|G1| (2k + 1)|G2| (2k + 1)|G1| √ O(λ) k-LIN
Wat05 [28] O(λL)|G1| O(λL)|G2| (1 + L)|G1| – O(λQ)L DBDH
Wat09 [27] O(L)|G1| O(L)(|G2|+ |Zq|) O(L)(|G1|+ |Zq|) – O(Q) 2-LIN
CW13 [7] O(Lk2)(|G1|+ |G2|) O(Lk)|G2| (2k + 2)|G1| – O(Q) k-LIN
HIBEHPS O(Lk
2)(|G1|+ |G2|) O(Lk)|G2| (2k + 2)|G1| – O(Q) k-LIN
HIBENR O(Lλk
2)(|G1|+ |G2|) O(Lλk)|G2| (2k + 1)|G1| – O(Lλ) k-LIN
AHIBEHPS O(Lk
2)|G1| O(Lk2)|G2| (2k + 2)|G1| √ O(Q) k-LIN
Table 1: Top: comparison between known adaptively secure IBEs with identity-space ID = {0, 1}λ in prime order
groups from standard assumptions. We count the number of group elements in G1,G2, and GT . Q is the number of
user secret key queries by the adversary. ‘Anon.’ stands for anonymity. Here IBEHPS := IBE[MACHPS[Dk], k-LIN],
IBENR := IBE[MACNR[Dk], k-LIN] are from this paper. Bottom: comparison of L-level HIBEs with identity-space
ID = ({0, 1}λ)L. HIBEHPS := HIBE[MACHPS[Dk], k-LIN], HIBENR := HIBE[MACNR[Dk], k-LIN] and AHIBEHPS :=
AHIBE[MACHPS[Dk], k-LIN] are from this paper.
k = 1 and the SXDH Assumption (i.e., DDH in G1 and G2). Interestingly, our SXDH-based IBE scheme
(given explicitly in Appendix D) can be seen as a “two-copy version” of Waters’ IBE [28] which does
not have a tight security reduction. The disadvantage of MACNR[Dk] is that the public parameters of
IBE[MACNR[Dk],Dk] are linear in the bit-size of the identity space.
Our second construction, MACHPS[Dk], is based on a hash proof system given in [12] for any Dk-
MDDH problem. A hash proof system is known to imply a UF-CMA-secure MAC [11]. We extend
this result to PR-CMA-security, where the reduction loses a factor of Q, the number of MAC queries.
Furthermore, MACHPS[Dk] is affine over Zk+1q (i.e., n = k + 1) and delegatable. Whereas public pa-
rameters of the L-level HIBE HIBE[MACHPS[Dk],Dk] only depend on L, ciphertexts and user secret keys
contain 2k + 2 group elements which is 4 in case of the SXDH assumption (k = 1). We remark that
the efficiency of HIBE[MACHPS[Dk],Dk] is roughly the same as a HIBE proposed in [7]. Additionally,
we show MACHPS[Dk] is also anonymity-preserving, which implies an anonymous (but non-tight) HIBE,
AHIBE[MACHPS[Dk],Dk], while the delegatable MACNR[Dk] is unlikely to be anonymity-preserving.
Table 1 summarizes all known (H)IBE scheme and their parameters.
Extensions. In fact, our generic transformation even gives (hierarchical) ID-based hash proof system
from any (delegatable) affine MAC and the Dk-MDDH assumption. From an (H)ID-based hash proof
system one readily obtains an IND-ID-CCA-secure (H)IBE [18]. Furthermore, any (H)IBE directly implies
a (Hierarchical ID-based) signature scheme [13, 17]. The signature obtained from IBE[MACNR[Dk],Dk]
has a tight security reduction. Even though it is not entirely structure preserving, it can still be used to
obtain a constant-size IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme with a tight security reduction in
the multi-user and multi-challenge setting [15, 4].
1.2 Technical details
Our Transformation. The high level idea behind our generic transformation IBE[MAC,Dk] from any
affine MAC over Znq to an IBE scheme is the transformation from Bellare and Goldwasser [2] from a MAC
(originally, a PRF) and a NIZK to a signature scheme. We use the same approach but define the user
secret keys to be Bellare-Goldwasser signatures. The (H)IBE encryption functionality makes use of the
special properties of the algebraic MAC and (tuned) Groth-Sahai proofs.
Concretely, the public key pk of the IBE scheme contains special perfectly hiding commitments [Z]1
to the MAC secret keys skMAC, which also depend on the Dk-MDDH assumption. The user secret key
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usk[id] of an identity id contains the MAC tag τid = ([t]2, [u]2) ∈ Gn+12 on id, plus a tuned Groth-
Sahai [14] non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof pi that τid was computed correctly with respect
to the commitments [Z]1 containing skMAC. Since the MAC is affine, the NIZK proof pi ∈ Gk is very
compact. The next observation is that the NIZK verification equation for pi is a linear equation in the
(committed) MAC secret keys and hence a randomized version of it gives rise to the IBE ciphertext and
a decryption algorithm.
Security Proof. The security proof can also be sketched easily at a high level. We first apply a
Cramer-Shoup argument [9], where we decrypt the IBE challenge ciphertext using the MAC secret key
skMAC. Next, we make the challenge ciphertext inconsistent which involves one application of the Dk-
MDDH assumption. Now we can use the NIZK simulation routine to simulate the NIZK proof pi from
the user secret key usk[id] = (τid, pi). At this point, as the commitments perfectly hide the MAC secret
keys skMAC, the only part of the security experiment still depending on skMAC is τid from usk[id] plus
the computation of the challenge ciphertext. Now we are in the position to make the reduction to the
symmetric primitive. We can use the PR-CMA symmetric security of MAC to argue directly about the
pseudorandomness of the IBE challenge ciphertext. An IBE with pseudorandom ciphertexts is both
IND-CPA secure and anonymous.
1.3 Other related work
Recently, Wee [29] proposed an information-theoretic primitive called predicate encodings that character-
ize the underlying algebraic structure of a number of predicate encoding schemes, including known IBE
[21] and attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20] schemes. The main conceptual difference to affine MACs
is that predicate encodings is a purely information-theoretic object. Furthermore, the framework by Wee
is inherently limited to composite order groups.
Waters introduced the dual system framework [27] in order to facility tighter proofs for (H)IBE
systems and beyond. The basic idea is that there exists functional and semi-functional ciphertexts and
user secret keys, that are computationally indistinguishable. Decrypting a ciphertext with a user secret
key is successful unless both are semi-functional. The Dk-MDDH assumptions are specifically tailored
to the dual system framework as they provide natural subspace assumptions over Gk+1. Previous dual
system constructions [27, 21, 7] usually first construct a scheme over composite-order groups and then
transform it into prime-order groups. As the transformation uses a subspace assumption over Gk+1 for
each component of the composite-order group, ciphertexts and user secret keys contain at least 2(k + 1)
group elements. An exception is a recent direct construction in prime-order groups by Jutla and Roy
[16]. Their scheme is based on the SXDH assumption (i.e., k = 1) and achieves slightly better ciphertext
size of 3 group elements plus one element from Zq. Even though our construction and proof strategy
is inspired by the Bellare-Goldwasser NIZK approach and Cramer-Shoup’s hash proof systems, we still
roughly follow the dual system framework. However, as we give a direct construction in prime-order
groups, our IBE scheme IBE[MACNR[Dk],Dk] has ciphertexts and user secret keys of size 2k+ 1, breaking
the “2(k + 1) barrier”.
Lewko and Waters [22] consider the difficulty of a security proof for L-level HIBEs that does not
proving exponentially in L. Essentially, they prove that any scheme with rerandomizable user secret keys
(over the space of all “functional" user secret keys) will suffer an exponential degradation in security.
While some of our tightly-secure HIBEs are rerandomizable, they are only rerandomizable over the space
of all user secret keys generated by the user secret key generation algorithm. Hence, our tightly-secure
HIBE does not contradict the negative results of [22].
1.4 Open problems
We leave finding a PR-CMA-secure algebraic MAC with a tight security reduction and constant-size secret
keys as an open problem. Given our main result this would directly imply a tightly-secure (H)IBE with
constant-size public parameters. Furthermore, we leave finding a tightly-secure and anonymity-preserving
delegatable affine MAC as an open problem, which would imply a tightly-secure anonymous HIBE.
Finally, we think that the concept of algebraic MACs can be extended such that our transformation
also covers more general predicate encoding schemes, including attribute-based encryption.
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2 Definitions
2.1 Notation
If x ∈ Bn, then |x| denotes the length n of the vector. Further, x←$ B denotes the process of sampling
an element x from set B uniformly at random. If A ∈ Z(k+1)×nq is a matrix, then A ∈ Zk×nq denotes the
upper matrix of A and then A ∈ Z1×kq denotes the last row of A.
Games. We use games for our security reductions. A game G is defined by procedures Initialize and
Finalize, plus some optional procedures P1, . . . ,Pn. All procedures are given using pseudo-code, where
initially all variables are undefined. An adversary A is executed in game G if it first calls Initialize,
obtaining its output. Next, it may make arbitrary queries to Pi (according to their specification), again
obtaining their output. Finally, it makes one single call to Finalize(·) and stops. We define GA as the
output of A’s call to Finalize.
2.2 Pairing groups and Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let GGen be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1λ returns a description
G = (G1,G2,GT , q, g1, g2, e) of asymmetric pairing groups where G1, G2, GT are cyclic groups of order q
for a λ-bit prime q, g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and G2, respectively, and e : G1 ×G2 is an efficiently
computable (non-degenerated) bilinear map. Define gT := e(g1, g2), which is a generator in GT .
We use implicit representation of group elements as introduced in [12]. For s ∈ {1, 2, T} and a ∈ Zq
define [a]s = gas ∈ Gs as the implicit representation of a in Gs. More generally, for a matrix A = (aij) ∈
Zn×mq we define [A]s as the implicit representation of A in Gs:
[A]s :=
ga11s ... ga1ms
gan1s ... g
anm
s
 ∈ Gn×ms
We will always use this implicit notation of elements in Gs, i.e., we let [a]s ∈ Gs be an element in
Gs. Note that from [a]s ∈ Gs it is generally hard to compute the value a (discrete logarithm problem in
Gs). Further, from [b]T ∈ GT it is hard to compute the value [b]1 ∈ G1 and [b]2 ∈ G2 (pairing inversion
problem). Obviously, given [a]s ∈ Gs and a scalar x ∈ Zq, one can efficiently compute [ax]s ∈ Gs.
Further, given [a]1, [a]2 one can efficiently compute [ab]T using the pairing e. For a,b ∈ Zkq define
e([a]1, [b]2) := [a
>b]T ∈ GT .
We recall the definition of the matrix Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption [12].
Definition 2.1 (Matrix Distribution) Let k ∈ N. We call Dk a matrix distribution if it outputs
matrices in Z(k+1)×kq of full rank k in polynomial time.
Without loss of generality, we assume the first k rows of A ←$ Dk form an invertible matrix. The
Dk-Matrix Diffie-Hellman problem is to distinguish the two distributions ([A], [Aw]) and ([A], [u]) where
A←$ Dk, w←$ Zkq and u←$ Zk+1q .
Definition 2.2 (Dk-Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption Dk-MDDH) Let Dk be a matrix distribu-
tion and s ∈ {1, 2, T}. We say that the Dk-Matrix Diffie-Hellman (Dk-MDDH) Assumption holds relative
to GGen in group Gs if for all PPT adversaries D,
AdvDk,GGen(D) := |Pr[D(G, [A]s, [Aw]s) = 1]− Pr[D(G, [A]s, [u]s) = 1]| = negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over G ←$ GGen(1λ), A←$ Dk,w←$ Zkq ,u←$ Zk+1q .
For each k ≥ 1, [12] specifies distributions Lk, Ck, SCk, ILk such that the corresponding Dk-MDDH
assumption is the k-Linear assumption, the k-Cascade, the k-Symmetric Cascade, and the Incremental
k-Linear Assumption, respectively. All assumptions are generically secure in bilinear groups and form
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a hierarchy of increasingly weaker assumptions. The distributions are exemplified for k = 2, where
a1, . . . , a6 ←$ Zq.
C2 : A =
a1 01 a2
0 1
 SC2 : A =
a1 01 a1
0 1
 L2 : A =
a1 00 a2
1 1
 U2 : A =
a1 a2a3 a4
a5 a6
 .
It was also shown in [12] that Uk-MDDH is implied by all other Dk-MDDH assumptions. If A is chosen
from SCk, then [A]s can be represented with 1 group element; if A is chosen from Lk or Ck, then [A]s can
be represented with k group elements; If A is chosen from Uk, then [A]s can be represented with (k+ 1)k
group elements. Hence, SCk-MDDH offers the same security guarantees as k-Linear, while having the
advantage of a more compact representation.
Let m ≥ 1. For W ←$ Zk×mq ,U ←$ Z(k+1)×mq , consider the m-fold Dk-MDDH problem which
is distinguishing the distributions ([A], [AW]) and ([A], [U]). That is, the m-fold Dk-MDDH problem
contains m independent instances of the Dk-MDDH problem (with the same A but different wi). By a
hybrid argument one can show that the two problems are equivalent, where the reduction loses a factor
m. The following lemma gives a tight reduction.
Lemma 2.3 (Random self reducibility [12]) For any matrix distribution Dk, Dk-MDDH is random
self-reducible. In particular, for any m ≥ 1,
AdvDk,GGen(D) +
1
q − 1 ≥ Adv
m
Dk,GGen(D′) := Pr[D′(G, [A], [AW])⇒ 1]− Pr[D′(G, [A], [U])⇒ 1],
with G ← GGen(1λ), A←$ Dk,W←$ Zk×mq ,U←$ Z(k+1)×mq .
3 Message Authentication Codes
We use the standard definition of a (randomized) message authentication codeMAC = (GenMAC,Tag,Ver),
where skMAC ←$ GenMAC(par) returns a secret key, τ ←$ Tag(skMAC,m) returns a tag τ on message m
from some message spaceM, and Ver(skMAC,m, τ) ∈ {0, 1} returns a verification bit.
3.1 Affine MACs
Affine MACs over Znq are group-based MACs with a specific algebraic structure.
Definition 3.1 Let par be system parameters containing a group G = (G2, q, g2) of prime-order q and let
n ∈ N. We say that MAC = (GenMAC,Tag,Ver) is affine over Znq if the following conditions hold:
1. GenMAC(par) returns skMAC containing (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x′0, . . . , x′`′), where B ∈ Zn×n
′
q , xi ∈ Znq , x′j ∈
Zq, for some n′, `, `′ ∈ N. We assume B has rank at least one.
2. Tag(skMAC,m ∈ B`) returns a tag τ = ([t]2, [u]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G2, computed as
t = Bs ∈ Znq for s←$ Zn
′
q (2)
u =
∑`
i=0
fi(m)x
>
i t+
`′∑
i=0
f ′i(m)x
′
i ∈ Zq (3)
for some public defining functions fi :M→ Zq and f ′i :M→ Zq. Vector t is the randomness and
u is the (deterministic) message-depending part.
3. Ver(skMAC,m, τ = ([t]2, [u]2)) verifies if (3) holds.
The standard security notion for probabilistic MACs is unforgeability against chosen-message attacks
UF-CMA [11]. In this work we require pseudorandom against chosen-message attacks (PR-CMA), which
is slightly stronger than UF-CMA. Essentially, we require that the values used for one single verification
equation (3) on message m∗ are pseudorandom over G1 and GT .
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Initialize:
skMAC ←$ GenMAC(par)
Return ε
Eval(m):
QM = QM ∪ {m}
Return ([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC,m)
Chal(m∗): //one query
h←$ Z∗q
h0 =
∑
fi(m
∗)xi · h ∈ Znq ; h1 =
∑
f ′i(m
∗)x′i · h ∈ Zq
h0 ←$ Znq ; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}):
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Figure 1: Games PR-CMAreal and PR-CMArand for defining PR-CMA security. In all procedures, the boxed
statements redefining (h0, h1) are only executed in game PR-CMArand.
Let G = (G1,G2,GT , q, g1, g2, e) be an asymmetric pairing group such that (G2, g2, q) is contained in
par. We define the PR-CMA security via games PR-CMAreal and PR-CMArand from Figure 1. Note that the
output ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T ) of Chal(m∗) in game PR-CMAreal can be viewed as a “token” for message m∗ to
check verification equation (3) for arbitrary tags ([t]2, [u]2) via equation e([h]1, [u]2)
?
= e([t]1, [h0]1) · [h1]T .
Intuitively, the pseudorandomness of [h1]T is responsible for indistinguishabilty and of [h0]1 to prove
anonymity of the IBE scheme.
Definition 3.2 An affineMAC over Znq is PR-CMA-secure if for all PPT A, Advpr-cmaMAC (A) := Pr[PR-CMAAreal ⇒
1]− Pr[PR-CMAArand ⇒ 1] is negligible, where the experiments are defined in Figure 1.
3.2 An Affine MAC from the Naor-Reingold PRF
Unfortunately, the (deterministic) Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function is not affine. We use the fol-
lowing randomized version MACNR[Dk] = (GenMAC,Tag,Ver) of it based on any matrix assumption Dk.
For the special case Dk = Lk, it was implicitly given in [7]. Recall that, for any matrix A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq we
denote the upper k rows by A ∈ Zk×kq and the last row by A ∈ Z1×kq .
GenMAC(par):
A← Dk; B := A ∈ Zk×kq
x1,0, . . . ,xm,1 ←$ Zkq ;x′0 ←$ Zq
Return skMAC = (B,x1,0, . . . ,xm,1, x′0)
Tag(skMAC,m):
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u = (
∑|m|
i=1 x
>
i,mi)t+ x
′
0 ∈ Zq
Return τ = ([t]2, [u]2) ∈ Gk2 ×G2
Ver(skMAC, τ,m):
If u = (
∑|m|
i=1 x
>
i,mi)t+ x
′
0
then return 1;
Else return 0.
Note that MACNR[Dk] is n-affine over Znq with message spaceM = {0, 1}m. Writing xi,b = x2i+b we have
n = n′ = k, `′ = 0, ` = 2m+ 1 and functions f0(m) = f1(m) = 0, f ′0(m) = 1, and f2i+b(m) = (mi = b) for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. (To perfectly fit our definition, xi,b should be renamed to x2i+b, but we conserve the other
notations for better readability.)
Theorem 3.3 MACNR[Dk] is tightly PR-CMA-secure under the Dk-MDDH assumption. In particu-
lar, for all adversaries A there exists an adversary D with T(A) ≈ T(D) and Advpr-cmaMACNR[Dk](A) ≤
4m(AdvDk,GGen(D)− 1/(q − 1)).
Note that the security bound is (almost) tight, as m is the bit-length of message space M. The proof
follows the ideas from [7, 24]. We use m hybrids, where in hybrid i all the (maximal Q) values x>i,1−m∗i · t
in the response to an Eval query are replaced by uniform randomness. Here m∗ is the message from
the challenge query. We use the Q-fold Dk-MDDH assumption to interpolate between the hybrids, where
the reductions guesses m∗i correctly with probability 1/2. As the Q-fold Dk-MDDH assumption is tightly
implied by the standard Dk-MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3), the proof follows.
We remark, that one can define an alternative version of MACNR[Dk] by setting x0 :=
∑
xi,0, xi :=
xi,1 − xi,0 and u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
i=1 mix
>
i )t+ x
′
0. This MAC has a shorter secret key and can also be shown
to be PR-CMA. (However, it does not satisfy the stronger security notion of HPR-CMA needed in Section
5.)
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Initialize: // Games G0, G1,i,G2
For j = 1, . . . ,m : xj,0,xj,1 ← Zkq
x′0 ←$ Zq; x′0 is undefined
Return ε
Chal(m∗): // Games G0, G1,i , G2 , one query
h←$ Zq; x′0 = RFi(m∗|i)
h0 = (
∑m
j=1 xj,m∗j ) · h; h1 = x′0 · h ∈ Zq
h0 ←$ Zkq ; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Eval(m): // Games G0, G1,i , G2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
t←$ Zkq
u =
∑m
j=1 x
>
j,mj t+ x
′
0
u =
∑m
j=1 x
>
j,mj t+ RFi(m|i)
u←$ Zq
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games G0-G2
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Figure 2: Games G0, G1,i (0 ≤ i ≤ m) and G2 for the proof of Lemmas 3.4 to 3.6. RFi : {0, 1}i → Zq is a
random function and m|i denotes the ith prefix of m. In each procedure, a solid (dotted) frame indicates that the
command is only executed in the game marked by a solid (dotted) frame.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Let A be an adversary against the PR-CMA-security of MACNR[Dk]. We prove
Theorem 3.3 by defining a sequence of intermediate games as in Figure 2 and 4.
Game G0 is the real attack game and in G1,0, we syntactically replace x′0 by RF0() which is a fixed
random element.
Lemma 3.4 Pr[PR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,0 ⇒ 1].
Lemma 3.5 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and |Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1] − Pr[GA1,i−1 ⇒ 1]| ≤
2(AdvDk,GGen(B)− 1q−1 )
Proof: Let Q be the maximal number of Eval queries made by A. We first build an adversary B′ against
the Q-fold Dk-MDDH Assumption such that
2AdvQDk,GGen(B′) ≥ |Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1]− Pr[GA1,i−1 ⇒ 1]|. (4)
This implies the lemma using the random self reducibility of the MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3).
On input of a Q-fold Dk-MDDH challenge ([A]2, [H]2) ∈ G(k+1)×k2 × G(k+1)×Q2 , B′ first picks a random
bit b which is a guess for m∗i . Let RFi−1 and RF
′
i−1 be two independent random functions (defined on the
fly) which we use to define
RFi(m|i) =
{
RFi−1(m|i−1) mi = b
RFi−1(m|i−1) + RF
′
i−1(m|i−1) mi = 1− b
,
The construction of B′ is described in Figure 3. Note that if RFi−1 and RF′i−1 are random functions, then
RFi is a random function.
Assume B′ correctly guesses b = m∗i (which happens with probability 1/2). By the definition of RFi and
by m∗i = b we have RFi(m∗|i) = RFi−1(m
∗
|i−1), which implies Chal(m
∗) is identically distributed in G1,i
and G1,i−1.
We now analyze the output distribution of the Eval queries. First note that t is uniformly random
over Zkq in both games G1,i and G1,i−1. As for the distribution of u, we only need to consider the case
mi = 1 − b, since u for mi = b is identically distributed in games G1,i and G1,i−1. Assume mi = 1 − b.
Write Hc = AWc +Rc for some Wc ∈ Zkq , where Rc = 0 (i.e., H is from the Dk-MDDH distribution) or
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Initialize:
b←$ {0, 1}
For j = 1, . . . ,m and j′ = 0, 1 :
If j 6= i or j′ = b then xj,j′ ←$ Zkq
r←$ Zk+1q ; x>i,1−bA := r>A ∈ Zkq
Return ε
Chal(m∗):
Abort if m∗i 6= b.
h←$ Zq; x′0 = RFi−1(m∗|i−1)
h0 = (
∑m
j=1 xj,m∗j )h ∈ Zkq
h1 = x
′
0h ∈ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Eval(m):
QM = QM ∪ {m}
c := αi(m|i)
s′ ←$ Zkq ; t = As′ +Hc
u =
{
(
∑|m|
j=1 x
>
j,mj )t+ RFi−1(m|i−1) mi = b
(
∑
j 6=i x
>
j,mj )t+ r
>(As′ +Hc) + RFi−1(m|i−1) mi = 1− b
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}):
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Figure 3: Description of B′(G, [A]2, [H]2) interpolating between the Games G1,i and G1,i−1, where Hc denotes
the c-th column of H and αi : {0, 1}i → {1, . . . , Q} is an injective function.
Rc is uniform. Then,
u =
∑
j 6=i
x>j,mjt+ r
>A(s′ +Wc) + r>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1)
=
∑
j 6=i
x>j,mjt+ x
>
i,1−bA(s
′ +Wc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
+r>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1)
=
|m|∑
j=0
x>j,mjt+ r
>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1).
If Rc = 0, then u is distributed as in game G1,i−1. If Rc is uniform, then define RF′(m|i−1) := r>Rc and
u is distributed as in G1,i.
Lemma 3.6 Pr[GA1,m ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1]
Proof: In G1,m, the values u computed in Eval(m) are masked by RFm(m) and are hence uniformly
random.
Finally, we do all the previous steps in reverse order, as shown in Figure 4. Clearly, H2 = G2 and
H0 = PR-CMArand. Following the arguments of Lemmas 3.4 to 3.6 in reverse order, one obtains the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.7 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and 2m(AdvDk,GGen(B) − 1/(q − 1)) ≥
|Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1]− Pr[PR-CMAArand ⇒ 1]|.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
3.3 An Affine MAC from Hash Proof System
Let Dk be a matrix distribution. We now combine the hash proof system for the subset membership
problem induced by the Dk-MDDH assumption from [12] with the generic MAC construction from [11]
and obtain the following MACHPS[Dk] forM = Z`q.
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Initialize: // Games H0, H1,i, H2
B←$ Zk×kq ; x′0 ←$ Zq
For i = 1, . . . ,m : xi,0,xi,1 ← Zkq
Return ε
Chal(m∗): //Games H0- H2, one query
h←$ Zq h0 ←$ Zkq ; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Eval(m): // Games H0, H1,i , H2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u←$ Zq
u = (
∑m
j=1 x
>
j,mj )t+ RFi(m|i)
u = (
∑m
j=1 x
>
j,mj )t+ x
′
0
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games H0-H2
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Figure 4: Games H0, H1,i (0 ≤ i ≤ m) and H2 for the proof of Lemma 3.7.
GenMAC(par):
B←$ Dk
x0, . . . ,x` ←$ Zk+1q
x′0 ←$ Zq
Return skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x′0)
Tag(skMAC,m):
s←$ Zkq
t = Bs ∈ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
i=1 mi · x>i )t+ x′0 ∈ Zq
Return τ = ([t]2, [u]2) ∈ Gk+12 ×G2
Ver(skMAC, τ,m):
If u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
i=1 mi · x>i )t+ x′0
then return 1
Else return 0
Note thatMACHPS[Dk] is n-affine over Znq with n = k+1, n′ = k, `′ = 0, and defining functions f0(m) = 1,
fi(m) = mi, and f ′0(m) = 1, where mi is the i-th component of m. For the moment we use ` = 1 which
already gives a MAC with exponential message spaceM = Zq.
Combining [12, 11] we obtain that MACHPS[Dk] is UF-CMA under the Dk-MDDH assumption. The
proof extends to show even PR-CMA security. Compared to MACNR[Dk], we lose the tight reduction, but
gain much shorter public parameters.
Theorem 3.8 MACHPS[Dk] is PR-CMA-secure under the Dk-MDDH assumption. In particular, for all
adversaries A there exists an adversary D with T(A) ≈ T(D) and Advpr-cmaMACHPS[Dk](A) ≤ 2Q(AdvDk,GGen(D)+
1/q), where Q is the maximal number of queries to Eval(·).
Initialize: // Games G0-G2
B←$ Dk; x′0 ←$ Zq
For j = 0, . . . , ` : xj ←$ Zk+1q
Return ε
Chal(m∗): //Games G0-G1,Q+1, G2
h←$ Zq
h0 = (x0 +
∑
m∗j · xj)h ∈ Zk+1q ; h1 = x′0h ∈ Zq
h0 ←$ Zk+1q ; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games G0-G2
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Eval(m): //Game G2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Eval(m): // Game G0
QM = QM ∪ {m}
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs ∈ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑m
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Eval(m): // Games G1,i,G′1,i
QM = QM ∪ {m} // Let m be the c-th query
(1 ≤ c ≤ Q)
If c < i then
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
If c > i then
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs; u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj ·x>j )t+x′0
If c = i then
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
t←$ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Figure 5: Games G0, (G1,i,G′1,i)1≤i≤Q,G1,Q+1,G2 for the proof of Theorem 3.8.
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Proof: We prove Theorem 3.8 by defining a sequence of intermediate games as in Figure 5. Let A be an
adversary against the PR-CMA-security of MACHPS[Dk]. Game G0 is the real attack game. In games G1,i,
the first i − 1 queries to the Eval oracle are answered with uniform values in Gk+12 × G2 and the rest
are answered as in the real scheme. To interpolate between G1,i and G1,i+1, we also define G′1,i, which
answers the i-th query to Eval by picking a random t←$ Zk+1q . By definition, we have G0 = G1,1.
Lemma 3.9 Pr[PR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,1 ⇒ 1].
Lemma 3.10 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B) ≥ |Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: Games G1,i and G′1,i only differ in the distribution of t returned by the Eval oracle for its i-
th query, namely, t ∈ span(B) or uniform. From that, we obtain a straightforward reduction to the
Dk-MDDH Assumption.
Lemma 3.11 |Pr[GA1,i+1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1]| ≤ 1/q.
Proof: At a high level, these two games are only separated by the 2-universality of the underlying hash
proof system. Let m be the i-th query to Eval and let ([t]2, [u]2) be its tag. As m 6= m∗, there exists an
index i′ such that mi′ 6= m∗i′ , where mi′ (resp. m∗i′) denotes the i′-th entry of m (resp. m∗). We use an
information-theoretic argument to show that in G′1,i the value u−x′0 is uniformly random. For simplicity,
we assume x′0 and xj (j 6∈ {0, i′}) are known to A. Information-theoretically, adversary A may also learn
B>x0 and B>xi′ from the c-th query with c > i. Thus, A information-theoretically obtains the following
equations in the unknown variables
(
x0
xi′
)
∈ Z2(k+1)q :

B>x0
B>xi′
h0
u− x′0
 =

B> 0
0 B>
h · Ik+1 m∗i′h · Ik+1
t> mi′t>

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:M∈Z(3k+2)×(2k+2)q
·
(
x0
xi′
)
where Ik+1 is the (k+ 1)× (k+ 1) identity matrix. To show that u−x′0 is linearly independent of B>x0,
B>xi′ and h0, we argue that the last row of M is linearly independent of all the other rows. Since
t /∈ span(B) (except with probability 1/q), t> is independent of B>; by mi′ 6= m∗i′ , the last row of M is
linearly independent of rows 2k+ 1 to 3k+ 1. We conclude that u is uniformly random in A’s view.
Lemma 3.12 Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,Q+1 ⇒ 1].
Proof: Note that A can ask at most Q-many Eval queries. In both G1,Q+1 and G2, all answers of Eval
are uniformly at random and independent of the secret keys (x′0,x0, . . . ,x`). Hence, the values h0 and
h1 from G1,Q+1 are uniform in the view of A.
We now do all the previous steps in the reverse order as in Figure 6. Then, by using the above arguments
in a reverse order, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.13 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and Q(AdvDk,GGen(B)+1/q) ≥ |Pr[PR-CMAArand ⇒
1]− Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1]|.
Theorem 3.8 follows by combining Lemmas 3.9-3.13.
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Initialize: // Games H0-H2
B←$ Dk; x′0 ←$ Zq
For j = 0, . . . , ` : xj ←$ Zk+1q
Return ε
Chal(m∗): //Games H0-H2
h←$ Zq; h0 ←$ Zk+1q ; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games H0-H2
Return d ∧ (m∗ /∈ QM)
Eval(m): //Game H0
QM = QM ∪ {m}
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Eval(m): // Games H1,i,H′1,i
QM = QM ∪ {m} // Let m be the c-th query (1 ≤ c ≤ Q)
If c > i then
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
If c < i then
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs; u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
If c = i then
t←$ Zk+1q
s←$ Zkq ; t = Bs ∈ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Eval(m): // Game H2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
i=1 mi · x>i )t+ x′0
Return ([t]2, [u]2)
Figure 6: Games H0, (H1,i,H′1,i)1≤i≤Q,H1,Q+1,H2 for the proof of Lemma 3.13.
4 Identity-based Encryption from Affine MACs
In this section, we will present our transformation IBE[MAC,Dk] from affine MACs to IBE based on the
Dk-MDDH assumption.
4.1 Identity-based Key Encapsulation
We now recall syntax and security of IBE in terms of an ID-based key encapsulation mechanism IBKEM.
Every IBKEM can be transformed into an ID-based encryption scheme IBE using a (one-time secure)
symmetric cipher.
Definition 4.1 (Identity-based Key Encapsulation Scheme) An identity-based key encapsulation
(IBKEM) scheme IBKEM consists of four PPT algorithms IBKEM = (Gen,USKGen,Enc,Dec) with the
following properties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen(1λ) returns the (master) public/secret key (pk, sk).
We assume that pk implicitly defines a message spaceM, an identity space ID, a key space K, and
ciphertext space C.
• The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns the user secret-key
usk[id] for identity id ∈ ID.
• The probabilistic encapsulation algorithm Enc(pk, id) returns the symmetric key K ∈ K together with
a ciphertext C ∈ C with respect to identity id.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Dec(usk[id], id,C) returns the decapsulated key K ∈ K or
the reject symbol ⊥.
For perfect correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Gen(1λ), all identities
id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (K,C) output by Enc(pk, id):
Pr[Dec(usk[id], id,C) = K] = 1.
The security requirements for an IBKEM we consider here are indistinguishability and anonymity
against chosen plaintext and identity attacks (IND-ID-CPA and ANON-ID-CPA). Instead of defining both
security notions separately, we define pseudorandom ciphertexts against chosen plaintext and identity
attacks (PR-ID-CPA) which means that challenge key and ciphertext are both pseudorandom. Note that
PR-ID-CPA trivially implies IND-ID-CPA and ANON-ID-CPA.
We define PR-ID-CPA-security of IBKEM formally via the games given in Figure 7.
12
Procedure Initialize:
(pk, sk)←$ Gen(1λ)
Return pk
Procedure USKGen(id):
QID ← QID ∪ {id}
Return usk[id]←$ USKGen(sk, id)
Procedure Enc(id∗): //one query
(K∗,C∗)←$ Enc(pk, id∗)
K∗ ←$ K;C∗ ←$ C
Return (K∗,C∗)
Procedure Finalize(β):
Return (id∗ 6∈ QID) ∧ β
Figure 7: Security Games PR-ID-CPAreal and PR-ID-CPArand for defining PR-ID-CPA-security.
Definition 4.2 (PR-ID-CPA Security) An identity-based key encapsulation scheme IBKEM is PR-ID-CPA-
secure if for all PPT A, Advpr-id-cpaIBKEM (A) := |Pr[PR-ID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]−Pr[PR-ID-CPAArand ⇒ 1]| is negligible.
4.2 The Transformation
Let Dk be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq . Let MAC be an affine MAC over Znq
with message space ID. Our IBKEM IBKEM[MAC,Dk] = (Gen,USKGen,Enc,Dec) for key-space K = GT
and identity space ID is defined as follows.
Gen(par):
A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0, . . . , x
′
`′)←$ GenMAC(par)
For i = 0, . . . , ` : Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′ : y′i ←$ Zkq ; z′i = (y′i> | x′i) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`, (y′i)0≤i≤`′)
Return (pk, sk)
USKGen(sk, id):
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
v =
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Yit+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)y
′
i ∈ Zkq
Return usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn+1+k2
Enc(pk, id):
r←$ Zkq
c0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c1 = (
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Zi) · r ∈ Znq
K = (
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)z
′
i) · r ∈ Zq.
Return K = [K]T and C = ([c0]1, [c1]1) ∈ Gn+k+11
Dec(usk[id], id,C):
Parse usk[id] = ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
Parse C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
K = e([c0]1,
[
v
u
]
2
) · e([c1]1, [t]2)−1
Return K ∈ GT
The intuition behind our construction is that the values [Zi]1, [z′i]1 from pk can be viewed as perfectly
hiding commitments to the secrets keys skMAC = (x1, . . . ,x`, x′1, . . . , x′`′) of MAC. User secret key genera-
tion computes the MAC tag τ = ([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC) plus a “non-interactive zero-knowledge proof”
[v]2 proving that τ was computed correctly with respect to the commitments. As the MAC is affine, the
NIZK proof has a very simple structure. The encryption algorithm is derived from a randomized version
of the NIZK verification equation. Here we again make use of the affine structure of MAC.
To show correctness of IBKEM[MAC,Dk], let (K,C) be the output of Enc(pk, id) and let usk[id] be the
output of USKGen(sk, id). By Equation (3) in Section 3, we have
e([c0]1,
[
v
u
]
2
) =
[
(Ar)> ·
(∑`
i=0 fi(id)Yit+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)y
′
i∑`
i=0 fi(id)x
>
i t+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)x
′
i
)]
T
e([c1]1, [t]2) =
[
(Ar)>
(∑
fi(id)Yi∑
fi(id)x
>
i
)
· t
]
T
and the quotient of the two elements yields K = (
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)z
′
i) · r.
Theorem 4.3 Under the Dk-MDDH assumption relative to GGen in G1 and the PR-CMA-security of
MAC, IBKEM[MAC,Dk] is a PR-ID-CPA-secure IBKEM. Particularly, for all adversaries A there exist
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Initialize: // Games G0-G4
G ←$ GGen(1λ);A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0, . . . , x
′
`′)←$ GenMAC(G)
For i = 0, . . . , ` : Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′ : y′i ←$ Zkq ; z′i = (y′i> | x′i) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`, (y′i)0≤i≤`′)
Return pk
Finalize(β): //Games G0-G4
Return (id∗ 6∈ QID) ∧ β
USKGen(id): //Games G0-G2, G3-G4
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
v =
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Yit+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)y
′
i ∈ Zkq
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi +
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i − u ·A) ·A−1
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
Return usk[id]
Enc(id∗): //Games G0, G1-G2 , G2 G3
r←$ Zkq ;
c∗0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c∗0 ←$ Zk+1q
h←$ Zq; c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 = (
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi)r ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0 ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · h)
K∗ =
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id
∗)z′i · r ∈ Zq.
K∗ =
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id
∗)(y′>i | x′i)c∗0 ∈ Zq
K∗ =
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id
∗)(z′i ·A−1c∗0 + x′i · h)
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Enc(id∗): //Game G4
K∗ ←$ GT and C∗ ←$ Gn+k+11
Return K∗ and C∗
Figure 8: Games G0-G4 for the proof of Theorem 4.3.
adversaries B1 and B2 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) ≈ T(B2) and Advpr-id-cpaIBKEM[MAC,Dk](A) ≤ AdvDk,GGen(B1) +
Advpr-cmaMAC (B2).
Proof of Theorem 4.3: We prove Theorem 4.3 by defining a sequence of games G0-G4 as in Figure 8.
Let A be an adversary against the PR-ID-CPA security of IBKEMMAC,Dk .
Lemma 4.4 Pr[PR-ID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1].
Proof: G0 is the real attack game. In game G1, we change the simulation of c∗1 and K∗ in Enc(id
∗) by
substituting Zi and z′i with their respective definitions:
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0
fi(id
∗)Zir =
∑`
i=0
fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)Ar =
∑`
i=0
fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0
and, similarly K∗ =
∑
f ′i(id
∗)(y′>i | x′i)Ar =
∑
f ′i(id
∗)(y′>i | x′i)c∗0. Thus, G1 is identical to G0.
Lemma 4.5 There exists an adversary B1 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B1) ≥ |Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: The only difference between G2 and G1 is that c∗0 is chosen uniformly at random over Zk+1q .
It is easy to see that the joint distribution of (G, [A]1, [c∗0]1) in G1 is identical to the real Dk-MDDH
distribution and (G, [A]1, [c∗0]1) in G2 is identical to the random Dk-MDDH distribution.
More formally, we build a distinguisher B1. B1 takes as input (G, [A]1, [b]1) and it has to distinguish if
b = Aw for some random vector w ∈ Zkq or b is uniformly random. B1 simulates USKGen and Finalize
the same way as in G2 and G1. We only describe the simulation of Initialize and Enc in Figure 9. Note
that B1 knows the secrets xi, x′i,Yi,y′i explicitly over Zq. Hence, B1 can compute ([Zi]1, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`)
from pk and ([c∗1]1, [K∗]T ) from from the encryption query from [A]1 and [b]1. If b = Aw for w←$ Zkq ,
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Initialize:
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0, . . . , x
′
`′)←$ GenMAC(G)
For i = 0, . . . , `: Yi ←$ Zk×nq ; Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A
For i = 0, . . . , `′: y′i ←$ Zkq ; z′i = (y′>i | x′i) ·A
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`, (y′i)0≤i≤`′)
Return pk
Enc(id∗):
c∗0 := b ∈ Zk+1q
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0 ∈ Znq
K∗ =
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id
∗)(y′>i | x′i)c∗0 ∈ Zq
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Figure 9: Description of B1(G, [A]1, [b]1) for the proof of Lemma 4.5.
then the simulation is distributed as in G1. If b is uniformly random, then the simulation is distributed
as in G2.
Following the intuition of the construction, in Game G3, we simulate the values v computed in the
USKGen algorithm using a “perfect zero-knowledge” simulator, and Enc is simulated without using
(Yi)0≤i≤` and (y′i)0≤i≤`′ , which is ready to conclude the proof by using the PR-CMA security of MAC.
Lemma 4.6 Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1].
Proof: G3 does not use (Yi)0≤i≤` and (y′i)0≤i≤`′ any more. We now show that the changes are purely
conceptual. By Zi = (Y>i | xi)A, we have Y>i = (Zi − xi · A) · (A)−1, and similarly we have y′>i =
(z′i − x′i ·A) · (A)−1. For USKGen(id), by substituting Y>i and y′>i , we obtain
v> =
(
t>
∑
fi(id)(Zi − xi ·A) +
∑
f ′i(id)(z
′
i − x′i ·A)
)
(A)−1
=
t>∑ fi(id)Zi +∑ f ′i(id)z′i − (t>∑ fi(id)xi +∑ f ′i(id)x′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
·A
 (A)−1.
Note that we can compute [v]2 in G2, since A, z′i and Zi are known explicitly over Zq and [t]2 and [u]2
are known.
As for the distribution of Enc(id∗), it is easy to see that c∗0 is uniformly random, as in G2. By h =
c∗0 −A ·A−1c∗0, we have
c∗1 =
∑
fi(id
∗
i )(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · (c∗0 −A ·A−1c∗0))
=
∑
fi(id
∗
i )(Y
>
i A+ xiA) ·A−1c∗0 + xi · (c∗0 −A ·A−1c∗0))
=
∑
fi(id
∗
i )(Y
>
i | xi)c∗0
and c∗1 is distributed as in G2. The distribution of K∗ can be analyzed with a similar argument.
Lemma 4.7 There exists an adversary B2 with T(B2) ≈ T(A) and Advpr-cmaMAC (B2) ≥ |Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: In G4, we answer the Enc(id∗) query by choosing random K∗ and C∗. We construct an adversary
B2 in Figure 10 to show the differences between G4 and G3 can be bounded by the advantage of breaking
PR-CMA security of MAC. Intuitively, the reduction to PR-CMA security of the symmetric primitive MAC
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Initialize:
A←$ Dk
ε←$ InitializeMAC
For i = 0, . . . , `: Zi ←$ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′: z′i ←$ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
Return pk
USKGen(id):
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Eval(id)
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi +
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i − u ·A) · (A)−1
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
Return usk[id]
Enc(id∗): //one query
([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )←$ Chal(id∗)
c∗0 ←$ Zkq
c∗0 = h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi ·A−1c∗0 + h0
K∗ =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)z′i ·A−1c∗0 + h1
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Finalize(β′):
Return (id∗ 6∈ QID) ∧ FinalizeMAC(β′)
Figure 10: Description of B2 (having access to the oracles InitializeMAC,Eval,Chal,FinalizeMAC of the
PR-CMAreal/PR-CMArand games of Figure 1) for the proof of Lemma 4.7.
can be carried out as in both G3 and G4, skMAC (i.e., xi and x′i) is perfectly hidden until B2’s call to
Enc(id∗).
If (h0, h1) is uniform (i.e., B2 is in Game PR-CMArand) then the view of A is the same as in G4. If (h0, h1)
is real (i.e., B2 is in Game PR-CMAreal) then the view of A is the same as in G3.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows by Lemmas 4.4-4.7 and observing that G4 = PR-ID-CPArand.
5 Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption from Delegatable Affine
MACs
In this section, we will define syntax and security requirements of delegatable affine MACs and describe
our transformation HIBE[MAC,Dk] from delegatable affine MACs to HIBE based on any Dk-MDDH
assumption.
5.1 Delegatable Affine MACs
Definition 5.1 An affine MAC over Znq (Definition 3.1) is delegatable, if the message space isM = B≤m
for some finite base set B, `′ = 0 with f ′0(m) = 1, and there exists a public function l :M→ {0, . . . , `}
such that for all m′ ∈ M with m′ = (m1, . . . ,mp+1) ∈ Bp+1 and length p prefix m = (m1, . . . ,mp) of m,
we have l(m) ≤ l(m′) and
fi(m
′) =
{
fi(m) 0 ≤ i ≤ l(m)
0 l(m′) < i ≤ ` .
Note that for a delegatable MAC, equation (3) simplifies to
u =
l(m)∑
i=0
fi(m)x
>
i +
l(m′)∑
i=l(m)+1
fi(m
′)x>i
 t+ f ′0(m)x′0.
Intuitively, this property will be used for HIBE user secret key delegation.
Security requirements. Let MAC be a delegatable affine MAC over Znq with message space M =
B≤m := ⋃mi=1 Bi. To build a HIBE, we require a new notion denoted as HPR0-CMA security. It differs
from PR-CMA security in two ways. Firstly, additional values needed for HIBE delegation are provided
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Initialize:
skMAC = (B, (xi)0≤i≤`, x′0)←$ GenMAC(par)
Return ([B]2, ([x>i B]2)0≤i≤`)
Eval(m):
QM = QM ∪ {m}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC,m)
For i = (m) + 1, . . . , `: di = x>i t ∈ Zq; d′i = x>i t′ ∈ Zq
Return ([t]2, [u]2, [t′]2, [u′]2, ([di]2)(m)+1≤i≤`)
Chal(m∗): // one query
h←$ Zq
h0 =
∑
fi(m
∗
i )xi · h ∈ Znq
h1 = x
′
0 · h ∈ Zq
h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(β ∈ {0, 1}):
Return β ∧ (Prefix(m∗) ∩QM = ∅)
Figure 11: Games HPR-CMAreal, and HPR0-CMArand for defining HPR0-CMA security.
to the adversary through the call to Initialize and Eval. Secondly, Chal always returns a real h0
which is the reason why our HIBE is not anonymous. (In fact, the additional values actually allow the
adversary to distinguish real from random h0.)
Let G = (G1,G2,GT , q, g1, g2, e) be an asymmetric pairing group such that (G2, g2, q) is contained in
par. Consider the games from Figure 11.
Definition 5.2 A delegatable affineMAC over Znq is HPR0-CMA-secure if for all PPTA, Advhpr0-cmaMAC (A) :=
Pr[HPR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[HPR0-CMAArand ⇒ 1] is negligible.
5.2 Examples of Delegatable Affine MACs
We first note that MACNR[Dk] from Section 3 with message spaceM = {0, 1}≤m is delegatable.
Theorem 5.3 Under the Dk-MDDH assumption, MACNR[Dk] is tightly HPR0-CMA secure. In partic-
ular, for all adversaries A there exists an adversary D with T(A) ≈ T(D) and Advhpr0-cmaMACNR[Dk](A) ≤
6m(AdvDk,GGen(D)− 1/(q − 1)).
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.3, with the difference that the reduction between games Gi and
Gi−1 now has to guess m∗i ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, where ⊥ means that |m∗| < i. Furthermore, h0 from Chal(m∗) is
not pseudorandom in the delegatable case, since ([B]2, ([x>i B]2)0≤i≤m) are disclosed from Initialize and
then it is easy to check if h0 is well-formed under m∗ by using the pairing. A formal proof of Theorem
5.3 is postponed to Appendix A.1.
We now turn to MACHPS[Dk] from Section 3 with message spaceM = B≤m = (Z∗q)≤m. Again, it can
be verified to be delegatable. One should remark the change on B, where we now define B = Z∗q to avoid
having a collision between the MAC of m and the MAC of m‖0.
Theorem 5.4 Under the Dk-MDDH assumption, MACHPS[Dk] is HPR0-CMA-secure. In particular, for
all adversaries A there exists an adversary D with T(A) ≈ T(D) and Advhpr0-cmaMACHPS[Dk](A) ≤ 2Q(AdvDk,GGen(D)+
1/q), where Q is the maximal number of queries to Eval(·).
The proof is postponed to Appendix A.2
5.3 Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation
We recall syntax and security of a hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (HIBKEM).
Definition 5.5 (Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism) A hierarchical identity-
based key encapsulation mechanism (HIBE) HIBKEM consists of three PPT algorithms HIBKEM =
(Gen,USKDel, ,USKGen,Enc,Dec) with the following properties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Gen(1λ) returns the (master) public/secret key and del-
egation key (pk, sk, dk). Note that for some of our constructions dk is empty. We assume that pk
implicitly defines a message space M and hierarchical identity space ID = B≤m, for some base
identity set B.
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Initialize:
(pk, sk, dk)←$ Gen(1λ)
Return (pk, dk)
USKGen(id):
QID ← QID ∪ {id}
Return (usk[id], udk[id])←$ USKGen(sk, id)
Enc(id∗): //one query
(K∗,C∗)←$ Enc(pk, id∗)
K∗ ←$ K
(K∗,C∗)←$ K × C
Return (K∗,C∗)
Finalize(β ∈ {0, 1}):
Return (Prefix(id∗) ∩QID = ∅) ∧ β
Figure 12: Games PR-HID-CPAreal, IND-HID-CPArand , and PR-HID-CPArand for defining IND-HID-CPA and
PR-HID-CPA-security. For any identity id ∈ Bp, Prefix(id) denotes the set of all prefixes of id (where |Prefix(id)| =
O(|B|p)).
• The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns a secret key usk[id]
and a delegation value udk[id] for hierarchical identity id ∈ ID.
• The probabilistic key delegation algorithm USKDel(dk, usk[id], udk[id], id ∈ Bp, idp+1 ∈ B) returns
a user secret key usk[id|idp+1] for the hierarchical identity id′ = id | idp+1 ∈ Bp+1 and the user
delegation key udk[id′]. We require 1 ≤ |id| ≤ m− 1.
• The probabilistic encapsulation algorithm Enc(pk, id) returns a symmetric key K ∈ K together with
a ciphertext C with respect to the hierarchical identity id ∈ ID.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Dec(usk[id], id,C) returns a decapsulated key K ∈ K or
the reject symbol ⊥.
For correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Gen(1λ), all id ∈ ID, all
usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (K, c) generated by Enc(pk, id):
Pr[Dec(usk[id], id,C) = K] = 1.
Moreover, we also require the distribution of usk[id|idp+1] from USKDel(usk[id], udk[id], id, idp+1) is iden-
tical to the one from USKGen(sk, id|idp+1).
In our HIBKEM definition we make the delegation key dk and the user delegation key udk[id] explicit to
make our constructions more readable. We define indistinguishability (IND-HID-CPA) and pseudorandom
ciphertexts (PR-HID-CPA) against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks for a HIBKEM via
games PR-HID-CPAreal, IND-HID-CPArand and PR-HID-CPArand from Figure 12.
Definition 5.6 (IND-HID-CPA and PR-HID-CPA Security) A hierarchical identity-based key encapsu-
lation scheme HIBKEM is IND-HID-CPA-secure if for all PPT A, Advind-hid-cpaHIBKEM (A) := |Pr[PR-HID-CPAAreal ⇒
1] − Pr[IND-HID-CPAArand] is negligible. It is PR-HID-CPA-secure if for all PPT A, Advpr-hid-cpaHIBKEM (A) :=
|Pr[PR-HID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[PR-HID-CPAArand] is negligible.
Note that PR-HID-CPA trivially implies IND-HID-CPA and anonymity of HIBKEM.
5.4 The Transformation
Let Dk be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq . Let MAC be a delegatable affine
MAC over Znq with message space M = B≤m. Our HIBKEM[MAC,Dk] = (Gen,USKGen,USKDel,Enc,
Dec) for key-space K = GT and hierarchical identity space ID = M = B≤m is defined as in Fig. 13.
Compared to the IBE construction from Sect. 4, the main difference is that Gen also returns a delegation
key dk which allows re-randomization of every usk[id]. Further, USKGen also outputs user delegation keys
udk[id] allowing USKDel to delegate.
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Gen(par):
A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0)←$ GenMAC(par)
For i = 0, . . . , ` :
Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
di = x
>
i ·B ∈ Zn
′
q ;Ei = Yi ·B ∈ Zk×n
′
q
y′0 ←$ Zkq ; z′0 = (y′0> | x′0) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
dk := ([B]2, ([di]2, [Ei]2)0≤i≤`)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`,y′0)
Return (pk, dk, sk)
USKGen(sk, id ∈ ID):
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
// t ∈ Znq ;u =
∑
fi(id)x
>
i t+ x
′
0 ∈ Zq
v =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Yit+ y
′
0 ∈ Zkq
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
di = x
>
i t ∈ Zq
ei = Yit ∈ Zkq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
udk[id] := ([di]2, [ei]2)l(id)<i≤` ∈ (G1+k2 )`−l(id)
Return (usk[id], udk[id])
Enc(pk, id):
r←$ Zkq
c0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c1 = (
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Zi) · r ∈ Znq
K = z′0 · r ∈ Zq.
Return K = [K]T and C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
USKDel(usk[id], udk[id], id ∈ Bp, idp+1 ∈ B):
If p ≥ m, then return ⊥
id′ := (id1, . . . , idp, idp+1) ∈ Bp+1
//Delegation of u and v:
uˆ = u+
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)di ∈ Zq
vˆ = v +
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)ei ∈ Zkq
//Rerandomization of uˆ and vˆ:
s′ ←$ Zn′q
t′ = t+Bs′ ∈ Znq
u′ = uˆ+
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)dis′ ∈ Zq
v′ = vˆ +
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)Eis′ ∈ Zkq
//Rerandomization of d′i and ei:
For i = l(id′) + 1, . . . , `:
d′i = di + dis
′ ∈ Zq
e′i = ei +Eis
′ ∈ Zkq
usk[id′] := ([t′]2, [u]2, [v′]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
udk[id′] := ([d′i]2, [e
′
i]2)l(id′)<i≤` ∈ (G1+k2 )`−l(id
′)
Return (usk[id′], udk[id′])
Dec(usk[id], id,C):
Parse usk[id] = ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
Parse C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
K = e([c0]1,
[
v
u
]
2
) · e([c1]1, [t]2)−1
Return K ∈ GT
Figure 13: Definition of the transformation HIBKEM[MAC,Dk].
To show correctness of HIBKEM[MAC,Dk], first note that (uˆ, vˆ) computed in USKDel is a correct user
secret key for id′, uˆ =
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)x>i t + x
′
0 and vˆ =
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)Yit + y′0. In the next step they get
rerandmozied as u′ =
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)x>i (t + Bs
′) and v′ =
∑l(id′)
i=0 fi(id
′)Yi(t + Bs′) + y′0. Consequently,
usk[id′] from USKDel has the same distribution as the one output by USKGen. By applying the similar
correctness argument from HIBKEM[MAC,Dk], we can show that a correctly generated ciphertext can be
correctly decapsulated by using a correct user secret key.
The next theorem shows IND-HID-CPA-security of our construction. Its proof is postponed to Ap-
pendix B.1. We remark that HIBKEM[MAC,Dk] can never be anonymous as one can always check whether
c0 ·
∑
fi(id)(E
>
i ‖di) = c1 ·B using the pairing.
Theorem 5.7 IfMAC is HPR0-CMA-secure and the Dk-MDDH assumption holds in G1 then HIBKEM[MAC,Dk]
is IND-HID-CPA secure. For all adversaries A there exist adversaries B1 and B2 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) ≈
T(B2) and Advind-hid-cpaHIBKEM[MAC,Dk](A) ≤ AdvDk,GGen(B1) + Adv
hpr0-cma
MAC (B2).
5.5 Anonymity-preserving Transformation
In this section, we give an alternative (but less efficient) transformation, which is anonymity-preserving.
Our transformation is based on the notion of APR-CMA-security (anonymity-preserving pseudorandom-
ness against chosen-message attacks) for a delegatable affine MAC MAC over Znq with message space
M = B≤m := ⋃mi=1 Bi. It differs from HPR-CMA-security (Section 5.1) in the sense that Eval(m) will
output the terms required for usk rerandomization, not Initialize. Let G = (G1,G2,GT , q, g1, g2, e) be
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Initialize:
skMAC = (B, (xi)0≤i≤`,x′0)←$ GenMAC(par)
Return ε
Eval(m):
QM = QM ∪ {m}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC,m)
S←$ Zn′×µq ; T = B · S ∈ Zn×µq
u =
∑l(m)
i=0 fi(m)x
>
i T ∈ Z1×µq
For i = (m) + 1, . . . , `:
di = x
>
i t ∈ Zq; Di = x>i T ∈ Z1×µq
Return ([t]2, [u]2, [T]2, [u]2, ([di]2, [Di]2)(m)+1≤i≤`)
Chal(m∗): // one query
h←$ Zq
h0 =
∑
fi(m
∗
i )xi · h ∈ Znq ; h1 = x′0 · h ∈ Zq
(h0, h1)←$ Znq × Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(β ∈ {0, 1}):
Return β ∧ (Prefix(m∗) ∩QM = ∅)
Figure 14: Games APR-CMAreal and APR-CMArand for defining APR-CMA security.
an asymmetric pairing group such that (G2, g2, q) is contained in par. Consider the games from Figure 14,
where the (publicly known) µ is defined as the rank of matrix B output by GenMAC(par).
Definition 5.8 An affineMAC over Znq is APR-CMA-secure if for PPT A, Advapr-cmaMAC (A) := Pr[APR-CMAAreal ⇒
1]− Pr[APR-CMAArand ⇒ 1] is negligible.
Unfortunately, MACNR[Dk] is unlikely to be APR-CMA-secure, since in the security proof the value
u is not pseudorandom and, thus, we can not make h0 random. The following theorem states that
MACHPS[Dk] from Section 3 with message spaceM = B≤m = (Z∗q)≤m is anonymous and delegatable.
Theorem 5.9 Under the Dk-MDDH assumption, MACHPS[Dk] is APR-CMA-secure. In particular, for all
adversaries A there exists an adversary D with T(A) ≈ T(D) and Advapr-cmaMACHPS[Dk](A) ≤ 2Q(AdvDk,GGen(D)+
1/q), where Q is the maximal number of queries to Eval(·).
The proof is postponed to Section A.3.
The Anonymity-Preserving Transformation. Let Dk be a matrix distribution that outputs matri-
ces A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq . Let MAC be an delegatable affine MAC over Znq with message spaceM = B≤m. Our
AHIBKEM[MAC,Dk] = (Gen,USKGen,USKDel,Enc,Dec) for key-space K = GT and hierarchical identity
space ID = M = B≤m is defined as in Fig. 15. Compared to the HIBE construction from Section 5.4,
the new construction uses a different usk rerandomization method: USKGen outputs a random basis T
for vector t which allows rerandomization of t; similarly, u and V are bases for randomizing u and v.
Further, Gen will never return [x>i B]2 and [YiB]2, which is the key to preserve anonymity.
Correctness of AHIBKEM[MAC,Dk] follows by the same argument as HIBKEM[MAC,Dk]. The fol-
lowing theorem shows PR-HID-CPA security of our construction. Its proof is the same as the one of
Theorem 5.7 except that we make the ciphertext to be random based on the APR-CMA security. Details
are postponed to Appendix B.2.
Theorem 5.10 IfMAC is APR-CMA-secure and the Dk-MDDH assumption holds in G1 then AHIBKEM[MAC,Dk]
is PR-HID-CPA secure. In particular, for all adversaries A there exist adversaries B1 and B2 with
T(B1) ≈ T(A) ≈ T(B2) and Advpr-hid-cpaAHIBKEM[MAC,Dk](A) ≤ AdvDk,GGen(B1) + Adv
apr-cma
MAC (B2).
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Gen(par):
A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0)←$ GenMAC(par)
For i = 0, . . . , ` :
Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
y′0 ←$ Zkq ; z′0 = (y′0> | x′0) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`,y′0)
Return (pk, sk)
USKGen(sk, id ∈ ID):
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
// t ∈ Znq ;u =
∑
fi(id)x
>
i t+ x
′
0 ∈ Zq
v =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Yit+ y
′
0 ∈ Zkq
S←$ Zn′×µq ; T = B · S ∈ Zn×µq
u =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)x
>
i T ∈ Z1×µq
V =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)YiT ∈ Zk×µq
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
di = x
>
i t ∈ Zq; Di = x>i T ∈ Z1×µq
ei = Yit ∈ Zkq ; Ei = YiT ∈ Zk×µq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
udk[id] := ([T]2, [u]2, [V]2, ([di]2, [Di]2, [ei]2, [Ei]2)l(id)<i≤`)
∈ Gn×µ2 ×G1×µ2 ×Gk×µ2 × (G2×G1×µ2 ×Gk2 ×Gk×µ2 )`−l(id)
Return (usk[id], udk[id])
Enc(pk, id):
r←$ Zkq
c0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c1 = (
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Zi) · r ∈ Znq
K = z′0 · r ∈ Zq.
Return K = [K]T and C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
USKDel(usk[id], udk[id], id ∈ Bp, idp+1 ∈ B):
If p ≥ m, then return ⊥
id′ := (id1, . . . , idp, idp+1) ∈ Bp+1
//Delegation of (u,v) and (u,V):
uˆ = u+
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)di ∈ Zq
vˆ = v +
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)ei ∈ Zkq
uˆ = u+
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)Di ∈ Z1×µq
Vˆ = V +
∑l(id′)
i=l(id)+1 fi(id
′)Ei ∈ Zk×µq
//Rerandomization of (uˆ, vˆ) and (uˆ, Vˆ):
s′ ←$ Zµq ; S←$ Zµ×µq
t′ = t+Ts′ ∈ Znq ; T′ = Tˆ · S′ ∈ Zn×µq
u′ = uˆ+ uˆ · s′ ∈ Zq; u′ = uˆ · S′ ∈ Z1×µq
v′ = vˆ + Vˆ · s′ ∈ Zkq ; V′ = Vˆ · S′ ∈ Zk×µq
//Rerandomization of d′i and ei:
For i = l(id′) + 1, . . . , `:
d′i = di +Dis
′ ∈ Zq; D′i = Di · S′ ∈ Z1×µq
e′i = ei +Eis
′ ∈ Zkq ; E′i = Ei · S′ ∈ Zk×µq
usk[id′] := ([t′]2, [u′]2, [v′]2)
udk[id′] := ([T′]2, [u′]2, [V′]2, ([d′i]2, [D
′
i]2, [e
′
i]2,
[E′i]2)l(id′)<i≤`)
Return (usk[id′], udk[id′])
Dec(usk[id], id,C):
Parse usk[id] = ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
Parse C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
K = e([c0]1,
[
v
u
]
2
) · e([c1]1, [t]2)−1
Return K ∈ GT
Figure 15: Definition of the transformation AHIBKEM[MAC,Dk]. µ denotes the rank of B.
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′
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A Security Proofs for the MACs
A.1 Security of Delegatable MACNR[Dk] (Theorem 5.3)
We prove Theorem 5.3 by defining a sequence of intermediate games G0-G2 as in Figure 16.
Similar to Lemma 3.4 and 3.4, we obtain the following lemma.
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Initialize:
b←$ {0, 1,⊥}
If b = 0 or b = 1:
r1−b ←$ Zk+1q ; x>i,1−bA := r>1−bA ∈ Z1×kq
Else for j = 0, 1:
rj ←$ Zk+1q ; x>i,jA := r>j A ∈ Z1×kq
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m and j′ = 0, 1:
if j 6= i or j′ = b then xj,j′ ←$ Zkq
Return ([A]2, ([x>j,j′A]2)1≤j≤m,j′=0,1)
Chal(m∗):
Abort if m∗i 6= b
h←$ Zq; x′0 = RFi(m∗|i)
h0 = (
∑|m∗|
j=1 xj,m∗j )h ∈ Zkq ; h1 = x′0h ∈ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Eval(m):
QM = QM ∪ {m}; c = αi(m|i)
s′ ←$ Zkq , t = As′ +Hc
u =
{
(
∑|m|
j=1 x
>
j,mj )t+ RFi−1(m|i−1) mi ∈ {b,⊥}
(
∑
j 6=i x
>
j,mj )t+ r
>(As′ +Hc) + RFi−1(m|i−1) mi = 1− b
dj,j′ = x
>
j,j′t (|m| < j ≤ m and j′ = 0, 1)
Return ([t]2, [u]2, ([dj,j′ ]2)|m|<j≤m,j′=0,1)
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}):
Return (Prefix(m∗) ∩QM = ∅) ∧ d
Figure 17: Description of B′(G, [A]2, [H]2) interpolating between the Games G1,i and G1,i−1, where Hc denotes
the c-th column of H and αi : {0, 1}i → {1, . . . , Q} is an injective function.
Lemma A.1 Pr[HPR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,0 ⇒ 1].
Lemma A.2 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B)− 1q−1 ≥ 13 |Pr[GA1,i ⇒
1]− Pr[GA1,i−1 ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: We build an adversary B′ against the Q-fold Dk-MDDH Assumption such that
AdvQDk,GGen(B′) ≥
1
3
|Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1]− Pr[GA1,i−1 ⇒ 1]|, (5)
which implies the lemma by the random self reducibility of the MDDH assumption (Lemma 2.3).
For any message m ∈ M := {0, 1}≤m, define mi := ⊥ if |m| < i. On input a Dk-MDDH challenge
([A]2, [H]2) ∈ G(k+1)×k2 × G(k+1)×Q2 , B′ first picks a random value b ∈ {0, 1,⊥} which is a guess for m∗i
and defines RFi : {0, 1}i → Zq as
RFi(m|i) =
{
RFi−1(m|i−1) mi = b or mi = ⊥
RFi−1(m|i−1) + RF
′
i−1(m|i−1) otherwise
, (6)
The definition of B′ is given in Figure 17. Note that if RFi−1 and RF′i−1 are random functions, then
RFi(m|i−1||b) and RFi(m|i−1||1− b) are independent and both uniformly random.
Assume B′ correctly guesses b = m∗i (which happens with probability 1/3). By the definition of RFi and
by m∗i = b we have RFi(m∗|i) = RFi−1(m
∗
|i−1), which implies Chal(m
∗) is identically distributed in G1,i
and G1,i−1.
We now analyze the output distribution of the Eval queries. First note that t is uniformly random
over Zkq in both games G1,i and G1,i−1. As for the distribution of u, we only need to consider the case
mi = 1− b, since u for mi ∈ {b,⊥} is identically distributed in games G1,i and G1,i−1. Assume mi = 1− b.
Write Hc = AWc +Rc for some Wc ∈ Zkq , where Rc = 0 (i.e., H is from the Dk-MDDH distribution) or
Rc is uniform.
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u =
∑
j 6=i
x>j,mjt+ r
>A(s′ +Wc) + r>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1)
=
∑
j 6=i
x>j,mjt+ x
>
i,1−bA(s
′ +Wc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
+r>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1)
=
|m|∑
j=0
x>j,mjt+ r
>Rc + RFi−1(m|i−1).
If Rc = 0, then u is distributed as in game G1,i−1. If Rc is uniform, then define RF′(m|i−1) := r>Rc and
u is distributed as in G1,i.
Lemma A.3 Pr[GA1,m ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1].
Proof: In G1,m, u returned by the Eval(m) oracle is masked by RFm(m), which is uniformly random
and independent of m and the secrets xj,j′ and x′0. Thus, u is uniformly random in game G1,m. Since
nothing about x′0 is leaked from Eval and x′0 = RFm(m∗), h1 is distributed uniformly at random over
Zq.
In contrast to Lemma 3.6, h0 is not pseudorandom here, since A learns ([x>j,j′B]2)1≤j≤m,j′=0,1 from
its call to Initialize. By checking the pairing equation e([h]1, [
∑
x>j,m∗jB]2) = e([h0]1, [B]2), A verifies if
h0 is properly computed.
Finally, we do all the previous steps in reverse order similar to Lemma 3.7, and then we end up with
the following lemma.
Lemma A.4 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and 3mAdvDk,GGen(B)− 3mq−1 ≥ |Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]− Pr[HPR0-CMAArand ⇒ 1]|.
Theorem 5.3 follows by combining Lemmas A.1-A.4
A.2 Security of Delegatable MACHPS[Dk] (Theorem 5.4)
We prove Theorem 5.4 by defining a sequence of intermediate games G0-G2 as in Figure 18.
Lemma A.5 Pr[HPR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1]
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.8, we now define the games G1,i and G′1,i. By the same arguments
as in Section 3.3, we have the following two lemmas:
Lemma A.6 Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,1 ⇒ 1]
Lemma A.7 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B) ≥ |Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1]|
Lemma A.8 |Pr[GA1,i+1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1]| ≤ 1/q.
Proof: At a high level, those two games are only separated by the 2-universality of the underlying hash
proof system. The following arguments are similar to Lemma 3.11. Let m the i-th queried message. We
have m 6= m∗, so there exists an index i′ such that mi′ 6= m∗i′ , where mi′ (resp. m∗i′) denotes the i′-th
entry of m (resp. m∗). By the definition of HPR0-CMA security, m can not be a prefix of m∗. Thus,
either i′ ≤ |m∗|, which leads to the same proof as in Lemma 3.11, or i′ ≥ |m∗| + 1 and m∗j = mj for all
j ≤ |m∗|. In the latter case, A obtains the following equations in the unknown variables x0,xi′ in an
information-theoretical way:
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Initialize: // Games G0-G2
B←$ Dk; x′0 ←$ Zq
For j = 0, . . . ,m : xj ←$ Zk+1q
Return ([B]2, ([x>j B]2)0≤j≤m)
Chal(m∗): //Games G0-G1,Q+1, G2
h←$ Zq
h0 = (x0
> +
∑
m∗i · x>i )h ∈ Zk+1q
h1 = x
′
0h ∈ Zq, h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games G0-G2
Return (Prefix(m∗) ∩QM = ∅) ∧ d.
Eval(m): // Games G2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
For j = |m|+ 1, . . . ,m: dj = x>j t
Return ([t]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Eval(m): // Games G0
QM = QM ∪ {m}
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
For |m| < j ≤ m: dj = x>j t
Return ([t]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Eval(m): // Games G1,i,G′1,i
QM = QM∪{m} //Let m be the c-th query (1 ≤ c ≤ Q)
If c < i then
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
If c > i then
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
If c = i then
s←$ Zkq ; t = Bs; t←$ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
For j = |m|+ 1, . . . ,m: dj = x>j t
Return ([t]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Figure 18: Games G0 to G2 for the proof of Theorem 5.4.

B>x0
B>xi′
h0
u− x′0
 =

B> 0
0 B>
h · Ik+1 0
t> mi′t>

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:M
·
(
x0
xi′
)
,
where B>x0 and B>xi′ are from Initialize, h0 is from Chal(m∗), and u − x′0 is from Eval(m). Ik+1
denotes the (k + 1)× (k + 1) identity matrix.
As shown in Lemma 3.11, the last row of M ∈ Z(3k+2)×(2k+2)q is linearly independent of the first 2k rows
(except with probability 1/q). Also, the last row is linearly independent of rows 2k + 1 to 3k + 1. Thus,
u−x′0 is linearly independent of B>x0, B>xi′ and h0 and therefore u is distributed uniformly at random
in G′1,i.
Lemma A.9 Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,Q+1 ⇒ 1].
Proof: In G2, we replace h1 output by Chal(m∗, c) with a random value. Similar to Lemma 3.12, since
all the answers of Eval are random and independent of x′0, h1 is uniformly random in the view of A.
We apply all the arguments before in a reverse order and then we easily get the following:
Lemma A.10 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and |Pr[HPR0-CMAArand ⇒ 1]−Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]| ≤ Q(AdvDk,GGen(B) + 1/q).
The proof of the theorem follows by combining Lemmas A.5-A.10.
A.3 Anonymity of delegatable MACHPS[Dk] (Theorem 5.9)
We prove Theorem 5.9 by defining a sequence of intermediate games as in Figure 19. Let A be an
adversary against the APR-CMA-security of MACHPS[Dk].
G0 is the real attack game and we have:
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Initialize: // Games G0-G2
B←$ Dk; x′0 ←$ Zq
For j = 0, . . . , ` : xj ←$ Zk+1q
Return ε
Chal(m∗): //Games G0-G1,Q+1, G2
h←$ Zq
h0 = (x0 +
∑
m∗j · xj)h ∈ Zk+1q ; h0 ←$ Zk+1q
h1 = x
′
0h ∈ Zq; h1 ←$ Zq
Return ([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}): // Games G0-G2
Return d ∧ (Prefix(m∗) ∩QM = ∅)
Eval(m): //Game G2
QM = QM ∪ {m}
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq
(T,u)←$ Z(k+1)×kq × Z1×kq
For j = |m|+ 1, . . . ,m : di = x>i t; Di = x>i T
Return ([t]2, [u]2, [T]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2, [Dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Eval(m): // Games G0
QM = QM ∪ {m}
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs ∈ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0 ∈ Zq
S←$ Zk×kq ; T = B · S ∈ Z(k+1)×kq
u = (x>0 +
∑
mjx
>
j )T ∈ Z1×kq
For |m| < j ≤ m: dj = x>j t ∈ Zq; Dj = x>j T ∈ Z1×kq
Return ([t]2, [u]2, [T]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2, [Dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Eval(m): // Games G1,i,G′1,i
QM = QM∪{m} //Let m be the c-th query (1 ≤ c ≤ Q)
If c < i then
(t, u)←$ Zk+1q × Zq; (T,u)←$ Z(k+1)×kq × Z1×kq
If c > i then
s←$ Zkq , t = Bs
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
S←$ Zk×kq ; T = B · S
u = (x>0 +
∑
mjx
>
j )T
If c = i then
s←$ Zkq ; t = Bs; t←$ Zk+1q
u = (x>0 +
∑|m|
j=1 mj · x>j )t+ x′0
S←$ Zk×kq ; T = B · S; T←$ Z(k+1)×kq
u = (x>0 +
∑
mjx
>
j )T
For j = |m|+ 1, . . . ,m: dj = x>j t; Dj = x>j T
Return ([t]2, [u]2, [T]2, [u]2, ([dj ]2, [Dj ]2)|m|<j≤m)
Figure 19: Games G0, (G1,i,G′1,i)1≤i≤Q,G1,Q+1,G2 for the proof of Theorem 5.9.
Lemma A.11 Pr[APR-CMAAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1].
In games G1,i, for the first i − 1 queries to the Eval oracle, (t, u,T,u) is answered with uniformly
random values and the rest are answered as in the real scheme. To interpolate between G1,i and G1,i+1, we
also define G′1,i, which answers the i-th query to Eval by picking random t←$ Zk+1q and T←$ Z(k+1)×kq .
By the same arguments as in Appendix A.2, we have the following two lemmas:
Lemma A.12 Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,1 ⇒ 1].
Lemma A.13 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B) ≥ |Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA1,i ⇒ 1]|.
Lemma A.14 |Pr[GA1,i+1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G′A1,i ⇒ 1]| ≤ 1/q.
Proof: Similar to Lemma A.8, let m be the i-th query to Eval. As m 6= m∗, there exists an index i′ such
that mi′ 6= m∗i′ , where mi′ (resp. m∗i′) denotes the i′-th entry of m (resp. m∗). We apply an information-
theoretical argument to show in G′1,i the values u and u are uniformly random. For simplicity, we assume
x′0 and xj (j 6∈ {0, i′}) are learned by A. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.11, we assume A learns B>x0
and B>xi′ . By the definition of APR-CMA security (Definition 5.8), m can not be a prefix of m∗. Thus,
either i′ ≤ |m∗| (Case 1) or i′ > |m∗|+ 1 and m∗j = mj for all j ≤ |m∗| (Case 2).
Case 1: From the execution of G′1,i, A information-theoretically obtains the following equations in the
unknown variables x0,xi′ :
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
B>x0
B>xi′
h0
u− x′0
u
 =

B> 0
0 B>
h · Ik+1 m∗i′h · Ik+1
t> mi′t>
T> mi′T>
 ·
(
x0
xi′
)
,
where h0 is from Chal(m∗), u and u are from Eval(m), and Ik+1 is the (k+1)× (k+1) identity matrix.
Since (t,T) is chosen uniformly from Z(k+1)×(k+1)q in G′1,i, t and T are not in the span of B and (t,T)
has rank k+1 (except with probablity at most 1/q), which implies u−x′0 and u are independent of B>x0
and B>xi′ . By mi′ 6= m∗i′ , u− x′0 and u are also independent of h0.
Case 2: Similarly, from the execution of G′1,i, A information-theoretically obtains the following equations
in the unknown variables x0,xi′ :

B>x0
B>xi′
h0
u− x′0
u
 =

B> 0
0 B>
h · Ik+1 0
t> mi′t>
T> mi′T>
 ·
(
x0
xi′
)
.
As in Case 1, u−x′0 and u are linearly independent of B>x0 and B>xi. It is easy to see that u−x′0 and
u are linearly independent of h0.
We conclude u and u are distributed uniformly at random in G′1,i.
Lemma A.15 Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1,Q+1 ⇒ 1].
Proof: Note that A can ask at most Q-many Eval queries. In both G1,Q+1 and G2, all answers of Eval
are uniformly random and independent of the secret keys (x′0,x0, . . . ,xL) where L = max{|m1|, . . . , |mQ|}.
Hence, the values h0 and h1 from G1,Q+1 are uniform in the view of A.
We apply the above arguments in a reverse order, we have the following lemma.
Lemma A.16 There exists an adversary B with T(B) ≈ T(A) and |Pr[APR-CMAArand ⇒ 1]− Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]| ≤ Q(AdvDk,GGen(B) + 1/q).
B Security of the generic transformations
B.1 Security of HIBKEM transformation (Theorem 5.7)
The proof of Theorem 5.7 is similar to the one of Theorem 4.3. We define the sequence of games G0-G4
as in Figure 20. Let A be an adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of HIBKEM[MAC,Dk]. G0 is
the real attack game (PR-HID-CPAreal) and Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[PR-HID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1].
By applying the same arguments as in Lemma 4.4 and 4.5, one can easily show the following two
lemmas.
Lemma B.1 Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1].
Lemma B.2 There exists an adversary B1 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B1) ≥ |Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]− Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1]|.
Lemma B.3 Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1].
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Initialize: // Games G0-G2, G3-G4
G ←$ GGen(1λ); A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0)←$ GenMAC(G)
For i = 0, . . . , ` :
Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
di = x
>
i ·B ∈ Zn
′
q ;Ei = Yi ·B ∈ Zk×n
′
q
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i B−A>di)
y′0 ←$ Zkq ; z′0 = (y′0> | x′0) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
dk := ([B]2, ([di]2, [Ei]2)0≤i≤`)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`,y′0)
Return (pk, dk)
USKGen(id): //Games G0-G2, G3-G4
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
v =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Yit+ y
′
0 ∈ Zkq
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi + z
′
0 − u ·A) ·A−1
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
di = x
>
i t ∈ Zq
ei = Yit ∈ Zkq ;
e>i = (t
>Zi − diA)A−1 ∈ Z1×kq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
udk[id] := ([di]2, [ei]2)l(id)<i≤` ∈ (G1+k2 )(`−l(id))
Return (usk[id], udk[id])
Enc(id∗): //Games G0, G1-G2 , G2 , G3
r←$ Zkq
c∗0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c∗0 ←$ Zk+1q
h←$ Zq; c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 = (
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi)r ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0 ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · h)
K∗ = z′0 · r ∈ Zq.
K∗ = (y′>0 | x′0)c∗0 ∈ Zq
K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + x′0 · h
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Enc(id∗): //Game G3, G4
h←$ Zq; c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗
i )(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · h)
K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + x′0 · h
K∗ ←$ Zq
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Finalize(β): //Games G0-G4
Return (Prefix(id∗) ∩QID = ∅) ∧ β
Figure 20: Games G0-G4 for the proof of IND-HID-CPA security (Theorem 5.7).
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.6, G3 is simulated without using y′0 and (Yi)0≤i≤`. By Y>i =
(Zi − xiA)A−1, we have
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i B−A>di) = (A−1)>(Z>i −A>x>i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yi
B
ei = (A
−1)> · (Z>i t−A> x>i t︸︷︷︸
di
) = Yit.
as in Game G2. By the same argument as Lemma 4.6, we have [v]2, K∗ and C∗ are identical to G2.
Lemma B.4 There exists an adversary B2 with T(B2) ≈ T(A) and Advhpr0-cmaMAC (B2) ≥ |Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1]|
Proof: In G4, we answer the Enc(id∗) query by choosing random K∗. We construct algorithm B2 in
Figure 21 to show the differences between G4 and G3 is bounded by the advantage of breaking hpr0-cma
security of MAC.
We note that, in games G3 and G4, the values xi and x′i are hidden until the call to Enc(id
∗). In both
games HPR-CMAreal and HPR0-CMArand, we have h = c∗0 − AA−1c∗0. Hence h0 =
∑
fi(mi)xi · (c∗0 −
A · A−1c∗0) which implies c∗1 is distributed identically in games G3 and G4. If h1 is uniform (i.e., B2
is in Game HPR0-CMArand) then the view of A is the same as in G4. If h1 is real (i.e., B2 is in Game
HPR-CMAreal) then K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + x′0 · h, which means the view of A is the same as in G3.
The proof follows by combining Lemmas B.1-B.4 and observing that G4 = IND-HID-CPArand.
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Initialize:
A←$ Dk
([B]2, ([x
>
i B]2)0≤i≤`)←$ InitializeMAC
For i = 0, . . . , `:
Zi ←$ Zn×kq ; di := x>i B
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i B−A>di)
z′0 ←$ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
dk := ([B]2, ([di]2, [Ei]2)0≤i≤`)
Return (pk, dk)
Enc(id∗): //only one query
([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )←$ Chal(id∗)
c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi ·A−1c∗0 + h0
K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + h1
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
USKGen(id):
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2, ([di]2)0≤i≤`)←$ Eval(id)
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi + z
′
0 − u ·A) · (A)−1
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
e>i = (t
>Zi − diA)A−1 ∈ Z1×kq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
udk[id] := ([di]2, [ei]2)l(id)<i≤` ∈ (G1+k2 )(`−l(id))
Return (usk[id], udk[id])
Finalize(β):
Return (Prefix(id∗) ∩QID = ∅) ∧ FinalizeMAC(β)
Figure 21: Description of B2 (having access to the oracles InitializeMAC,Eval,Chal,FinalizeMAC of the
HPR-CMAreal/HPR-CMArand games of Figure 11) for the proof of Lemma B.4.
B.2 Security of the Anonymous HIBKEM transformation (Theorem 5.10)
The proof of Theorem 5.10 is similar to the one of Theorem 5.7. We define the sequence of games G0-G4
in Figure 22. Let A be an adversary against the PR-HID-CPA security of AHIBKEM[MAC,Dk]. G0 is the
real attack game (PR-HID-CPAreal) and Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1] = Pr[PR-HID-CPAAreal ⇒ 1].
Analogously to Lemmas B.1 and B.2, we have
Lemma B.5 Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1].
Lemma B.6 There exists an adversary B1 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B1) ≥ |Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]− Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1]|.
Lemma B.7 Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1].
Proof: G3 is defined without using y′0 and (Yi)0≤i≤`. By Lemma B.3, we have values [v]2, [ei]2, [Ei]2,K∗
and C∗ are identical in both G3 and G2. By Y>i = (Zi − xiA)A−1, we have
V =
∑
fi(id)(A
−1)>(Z>i −A>x>i )T = (A−1)>(
∑
fi(id)Z
>
i T−A>
∑
fi(id)x
>
i T︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
)
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i −A>x>i )T = (A−1)>(Z>i T−A> x>i T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Di
).
Thus, G3 is identical to G2.
Lemma B.8 There exists an adversary B2 with T(B2) ≈ T(A) and Advapr-cmaMAC (B2) ≥ |Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: In G4, we answer the Enc(id∗) query by choosing random K∗ and C∗. We construct algorithm
B2 in Figure 23 to show the differences between G4 and G3 is bounded by the advantage of breaking
APR-CMA security of MAC.
We note that, in both G3 and G4, the values xi and x′0 are hidden until the call to Enc(id
∗). It is easy
to see c∗0 is uniform, since h and c∗0 are chosen uniformly at random. If (h0, h1) is uniform (i.e. B2 is
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Initialize: // Games G0-G4
G ←$ GGen(1λ); A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0)←$ GenMAC(G)
For i = 0, . . . , ` :
Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
y′0 ←$ Zkq ; z′0 = (y′0> | x′0) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`,y′0)
Return pk
USKGen(id): //Games G0-G2, G3-G4
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
v =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)Yit+ y
′
0 ∈ Zkq
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi + z
′
0 − u ·A) ·A−1
S←$ Zn′×µq ; T = B · S ∈ Zn×µq ;
u =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)x
>
i T ∈ Z1×µq
V =
∑l(id)
i=0 fi(id)YiT ∈ Zk×µq
V = (A−1)>(
∑
fi(id)Z
>
i ·T−A> · u)
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
di = x
>
i t ∈ Zq; Di = x>i T ∈ Z1×µq
ei = Yit ∈ Zkq ; Ei = YiT ∈ Zk×µq
e>i = (t
>Zi − diA)A−1 ∈ Z1×kq
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i T−A> ·Di) ∈ Zk×µq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
udk[id] := ([T]2, [u]2, [V]2, ([di]2, [Di]2, [ei]2, [Ei]2)l(id)<i≤`)
Return (usk[id], udk[id])
Enc(id∗): //Games G0, G1-G2 , G2 , G3
r←$ Zkq
c∗0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c∗0 ←$ Zk+1q
h←$ Zq; c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 = (
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi)r ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0 ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · h)
K∗ = z′0 · r ∈ Zq.
K∗ = (y′>0 | x′0)c∗0 ∈ Zq
K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + x′0 · h
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1).
Enc(id∗): //Game G4
K∗ ←$ GT ; C∗ ←$ Gn+k+11
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1).
Finalize(β): //Games G0-G4
Return (Prefix(id∗) ∩QID = ∅) ∧ β.
Figure 22: Games G0-G4 for the proof of PR-HID-CPA security (Theorem 5.10).
in Game APR-CMArand) then the view of A is the same as in G4. If (h0, h1) is real (i.e. B2 is in Game
APR-CMAreal) then the view of A is the same as in G3.
The proof follows by combining Lemmas B.5-B.8 and observing that G4 = PR-HID-CPArand.
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Initialize:
A←$ Dk; ε←$ InitializeMAC
For i = 0, . . . , `: Zi ←$ Zn×kq
z′0 ←$ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′0]1)
Return pk
Enc(id∗): //only one query
([h]1, [h0]1, [h1]T )←$ Chal(id∗)
c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑l(id∗)
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi ·A−1c∗0 + h0
K∗ = z′0 ·A−1c∗0 + h1
Return K∗ = [K∗]T and C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1).
USKGen(id):
QID = QID ∪ {id}
([t]2, [u]2, [T]2, [u]2, ([di]2, [Di]2)(m)<i≤`)←$ Eval(id)
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi + z
′
0 − u ·A) · (A)−1
V = (A−1)>(
∑
fi(id)Z
>
i ·T−A> · u)
For i = l(id) + 1, . . . , `:
e>i = (t
>Zi − diA)A−1 ∈ Z1×kq
Ei = (A
−1)>(Z>i T−A> ·Di) ∈ Zk×µq
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
udk[id] := ([T]2, [u]2, [V]2, ([di]2, [D2], [ei]2, [Ei]2)l(id)<i≤`)
Return (usk[id], udk[id]).
Finalize(β):
Return (Prefix(id∗) ∩QID = ∅) ∧ FinalizeMAC(β).
Figure 23: Description of B2 (having access to the oracles InitializeMAC,Eval,Chal,FinalizeMAC of the
APR-CMAreal/APR-CMArand games of Figure 14) for the proof of Lemma B.8.
C Identity-based Hash Proof System
In this section, we will show that our IBE construction from Section 4 gives a secure identity-based hash
proof system (ID-HPS) [1], which implies IND-CCA secure [18] and leakage-resilent [1] IBE. Moreover,
one of our constructions is the first tightly secure ID-HPS without a “q-type" assumption in prime-order
groups.
C.1 Definitions
We recall syntax and security of ID-HPS from [1].
Definition C.1 (Identity-based Hash Proof System) An identity-based hash proof system (ID-HPS)
consists of five PPT algorithms IDHPS = (Setup,USKGen,Encap,Encap∗,Decap) with the following prop-
erties.
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm Setup(par) returns the (master) public/secret key (pk, sk).
We assume that pk implicitly defines an identity space ID, an encapsulated-key set K.
• The probabilistic user secret key generation algorithm USKGen(sk, id) returns the secret key usk[id]
for an identity id ∈ ID.
• The probabilistic valid encapsulation algorithm Encap(pk, id) returns a pair (c,K) where c is a valid
ciphertext, and K ∈ K is the encapsulated-key with respect to identity id.
• The probabilistic invalid encapsulation algorithm Encap∗(pk, id) samples an invalid ciphertext c.
• The deterministic decapsulation algorithm Decap(usk[id], c) returns a decapsulated key K.
For perfect correctness we require that for all λ ∈ N, all pairs (pk, sk) generated by Setup(1λ), all
identities id ∈ ID, all usk[id] generated by USKGen(sk, id) and all (c,K) output by Encap(pk, id):
Pr[Decap(usk[id], id, c) = K] = 1.
The security requirements for an ID-HPS are valid/invalid ciphertext indistinguishability (VI-IND)
and smoothness. VI-IND security is defined via the games VI-INDreal and VI-INDrand in Figure 24. Note
that VI-IND security game, the adversary is allowed to ask for usk[id∗] (where id∗ is the challenge identity)
and that USKGen(id) returns the same answer when queried twice on the same identity.
Definition C.2 (VI-IND Security) An identity-based hash proof system IDHPS is VI-IND-secure if for
all PPT A, Advvi-indIDHPS(A) := |Pr[VI-INDAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[VI-INDArand ⇒ 1]| is negligible.
Smoothness is a statistical property saying that the decapsulated key K for an invalid ciphertext is
distributed statistically close to the uniform distribution.
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Initialize:
(pk, sk)←$ Setup(par)
Return pk
Enc(id∗): //one query
(C∗,K∗)←$ Encap(pk, id∗)
C∗ ←$ Encap∗(pk, id∗)
Return C∗
USKGen(id):
If usk[id] = ⊥, then
usk[id]←$ USKGen(sk, id)
QID := (id, usk[id]) ∪QID
Return usk[id]
Finalize(β′):
Return β′
Figure 24: Games VI-INDreal and VI-INDrand for defining valid/invalid ciphertext indistinguishability. We note
that in game VI-INDrand the adversary is allowed to query USKGen with the challenge id∗.
Definition C.3 (Statistical Distance) The statistical distance between two random variables X and
Y over a finite domain Ω is defined as:
SD(X,Y ) :=
1
2
∑
w∈Ω
|Pr[X = w]− Pr[Y = w]|.
Definition C.4 (Smooth ID-HPS) An identity-based hash proof system IDHPS is smooth if for any
fixed (pk, sk) produced by Setup(par), any id ∈ ID,
SD((C,K), (C,K′)) ≤ negl(λ),
where C←$ Encap∗(id), K← Decap(C, usk[id]), K′ ←$ K and usk[id]←$ USKGen(sk, id).
C.2 Construction
Let Dk be a matrix distribution that outputs matrices A ∈ Z(k+1)×kq . Let MAC be an affine MAC over
Znq with message space ID. In Figure 25, we describe the transformation IDHPS[MAC,Dk]. We note that
Setup,USKGen,Encap and Decap are the same as in IBKEM[MAC,Dk] from Section 4 and Encap∗ returns
a random ciphertext C from the ciphertext space C = Gn+k+11 . Correctness of IDHPS[MAC,Dk] follows
from the correctness of IBE[MAC,Dk].
Setup(par):
A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0, . . . , x
′
`′)←$ GenMAC(par)
For i = 0, . . . , ` : Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′ : y′i ←$ Zkq ; z′i = (y′i> | x′i) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`, (y′i)0≤i≤`′)
Return (pk, sk)
USKGen(sk, id):
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
v =
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Yit+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)y
′
i ∈ Zkq
Return usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn+1+k2
Encap(pk, id):
r←$ Zkq
c0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q
c1 = (
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Zi) · r ∈ Znq
K = (
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)z
′
i) · r ∈ Zq.
Return K = [K]T and C = ([c0]1, [c1]1) ∈ Gn+k+11
Encap∗(pk, id):
(c0, c1)←$ Zn+k+1q
Return C = ([c0]1, [c1]1) ∈ Gn+k+11
Decap(usk[id],C):
Parse usk[id] = ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
Parse C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
K = e([c0]1,
[
v
u
]
2
) · e([c1]1, [t]2)−1
Return K ∈ GT
Figure 25: Definition of the ID-based HPS IDHPS[MAC,Dk].
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Initialize:
skMAC ←$ GenMAC(par)
Return ε
Chal(m∗): //one query
h←$ Zq; h0[m∗] =∑ fi(m∗)xi ∈ Znq
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Eval(m∗)
Return ([h]1, [h0[m∗] · h]1)
Eval(m):
If (t[m], u[m]) = (⊥,⊥) then
([t[m]]2, [u[m]]2)←$ Tag(skMAC,m)
t[m]←$ Znq ;h0[m]←$ Znq ;h1[m]←$ Zq
u[m] = h0[m] · t[m] + h1[m]
Return ([t[m]]2, [u[m]]2)
Finalize(d ∈ {0, 1}):
Return d
Figure 26: Games SPR-CMAreal and SPR-CMArand for defining SPR-CMA security.
C.3 Security
We show that our ID-HPS is both smooth and VI-IND secure.
For the proof of VI-IND security, we require a security notion for the affine MAC that is slightly
stronger than PR-CMA security in the sense that we allow the adversary to query Eval with the challenge
message m∗ in order to fit the definition of VI-IND security. We call it strong pseudorandomness against
chosen-message attacks (SPR-CMA) defined via the security games in Figure 26.
Definition C.5 An affineMAC over Znq is SPR-CMA-secure if for all PPT A, Advspr-cmaMAC (A) := Pr[SPR-CMAAreal
⇒ 1]− Pr[SPR-CMAArand ⇒ 1] is negligible, where the experiments are defined in Figure 26.
We note that bothMACNR[Dk] andMACHPS[Dk] are SPR-CMA secure. The security proof from Section
3 can be easily adapted to show both schemes are SPR-CMA secure. Here we just outline the ideas. For
MACNR[Dk], we first use the Q-fold Dk-MDDH assumption to make the answers all Eval queries random;
next, we store a list of (h0[·], h1[·]) values to make the output of Chal(m∗) random and consistent with
Eval(m∗). One can also adapt the proof of MACHPS[Dk] in a similar way.
The following theorem shows VI-IND security of IDHPS[MAC,Dk].
Theorem C.6 Under the Dk-MDDH assumption relative to GGen in G1 and SPR-CMA security of MAC,
IDSPHF[MAC,Dk] is a VI-IND secure ID-SPHF. Particularly, for all adversaries A there exist adversaries
B1 and B2 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) ≈ T(B2) and Advvi-indIDHPS[MAC,Dk](A) ≤ AdvDk,GGen(B1) + Advspr-cmaMAC (B2).
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 4.3 except that we need to simulate the user secret
key for the challenge identity id∗. The games are defined as in Figure 27.
The following three lemmas and their proofs are exactly the same as Lemmas 4.4 to 4.6.
Lemma C.7 Pr[VI-INDAreal ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1].
Lemma C.8 There exists an adversary B1 with T(B1) ≈ T(A) and AdvDk,GGen(B1) ≥ |Pr[GA2 ⇒
1]− Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1]|.
Lemma C.9 Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1].
Lemma C.10 There exists an adversary B2 with T(B2) ≈ T(A) and Advspr-cmaMAC (B2) ≥ |Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1]|.
Proof: We construct an adversary B2 in Figure 28 to show that the difference between G4 and G3 is
bounded by the advantage of breaking SPR-CMA security of MAC.
By the definition of SPR-CMA, if B2 is in Game SPR-CMArand then the view of A is the same as in G4;
and if B2 is in Game SPR-CMAreal then the view of A is the same as in G3.
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Initialize: // Games G0-G4
G ←$ GGen(1λ);A←$ Dk
skMAC = (B,x0, . . . ,x`, x
′
0, . . . , x
′
`′)←$ GenMAC(G)
For i = 0, . . . , ` : Yi ←$ Zk×nq ;Zi = (Y>i | xi) ·A ∈ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′ : y′i ←$ Zkq ; z′i = (y′i> | x′i) ·A ∈ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
sk := (skMAC, (Yi)0≤i≤`, (y′i)0≤i≤`′)
Return pk
USKGen(id): //Games G0-G2, G3-G4 , G4
If usk[id] = ⊥ then
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Tag(skMAC, id)
t←$ Znq ;h0[id]←$ Znq ;h1[id]←$ Zq
u = h0[id]t+ h1[id]
v =
∑`
i=0 fi(id)Yit+
∑`′
i=0 f
′
i(id)y
′
i ∈ Zkq
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi +
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i − u ·A) ·A−1
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
Return usk[id]
Enc(id∗): //Games G0, G1-G2 , G2 , G3
r←$ Zkq
c∗0 = Ar ∈ Zk+1q ; c∗0 ←$ Zk+1q
h←$ Zq, c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 = (
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi)r ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Y>i | xi)c∗0 ∈ Znq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Zi ·A−1c∗0 + xi · h)
Return C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Enc(id∗): //Game G4
Call usk[id∗]←$ USKGen(id∗)
h←$ Zq, c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 := h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)(Zi ·A−1c∗0) + h0[id∗] · h
Return C∗ := ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
Finalize(β′): //Game G1-G4
Return β′
Figure 27: Games G0-G4 for the proof of the VI-IND security.
Initialize:
A←$ Dk
ε←$ InitializeMAC
For i = 0, . . . , `: Zi ←$ Zn×kq
For i = 0, . . . , `′: z′i ←$ Z1×kq
pk := (G, [A]1, ([Zi]1)0≤i≤`, ([z′i]1)0≤i≤`′)
Return pk
Enc(id∗): //one query
([h]1, [h0[id
∗] · h]1)←$ Chal(id∗)
c∗0 ←$ Zkq ; c∗0 = h+A ·A−1c∗0 ∈ Zq
c∗1 =
∑`
i=0 fi(id
∗)Zi ·A−1c∗0 + h0[id∗] · h
Return C∗ = ([c∗0]1, [c∗1]1)
USKGen(id):
If usk[id] = ⊥ then
([t]2, [u]2)←$ Eval(id)
v> = (t>
∑
fi(id)Zi +
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i − u ·A) ·A−1
usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ Gn2 ×G12 ×Gk2
QID = QID ∪ {(id, usk[id])}
Return usk[id]
Figure 28: Description of B2 (having access to the oracles InitializeMAC,Eval,Chal,FinalizeMAC of the
PR-CMAreal/PR-CMArand games of Figure 26) for the proof of Lemma C.10.
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We observe that in Game G4 c∗1 is masked by the value h0[id
∗], which is uniformly random. The reason
is that h0[id∗] is hidden from USKGen(id∗) query, since it is masked by a random h1[id∗]. Thus, G4 =
VI-INDrand.
Theorem C.11 IDHPS[MAC,Dk] is smooth.
Proof: We show that for almost all (c0, c1) ∈ Zn+k+1q , K = c>0
(
v
u
)
− c>1 t is uniformly random, where
([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)←$ USKGen(id). Similar to game G3 of VI-IND security proof, one can rewrite:
K = c>0
(
v
u
)
− c>1 t
= c>0
(
((t>
∑
fi(id)Zi +
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i − u ·A) ·A−1)>
u
)
− c>1 t
= c>0 (A
−1)>
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i + (c
>
0 − (AA−1c0)>)u+ ((
∑
fi(id)Zi ·A−1 · c0)> − c>1 )t
= c>0 (A
−1)>
∑
f ′i(id)z
′
i + (c
>
0 − (AA−1c0)>)
∑
f ′i(id)x
′
i (substituting u)
+ ((c>0 − (AA−1c0)>)
∑
fi(id)x
>
i + (
∑
fi(id)Zi ·A−1 · c0)> − c>1 )t︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
Since (c0, c1) from Encap∗ is chosen uniformly at random, c>1 6= (c>0 − (AA−1c0)>)
∑
fi(id)x
>
i +
(
∑
fi(id)Zi · A−1 · c0)> with probability 1 − 1/qn. Conditioned on that and since rank(B) ≥ 1 and
t = Bs (for s←$ Zn′q ), E is uniformly random. This concludes the theorem.
D Concrete Instantiation from SXDH
We now describe our tightly PR-ID-CPA-secure IBKEM IBKEM[MACNR[Dk],U1] for the special case of
k = 1 and Dk = U1, such that Dk-MDDH is the DDH assumption. The identity space is ID = {0, 1}`.
Theorems 4.3 and 3.3 provide a tight security reduction under the the DDH assumptions in G1 and G2,
i.e., under the SXDH assumption.
Gen(par):
skMAC = (x0, . . . , x`, x
′)←$ Z`+2q
a←$ Zq
For i = 0, . . . , ` : yi ←$ Zq; zi = ayi + xi ∈ Zq
y′ ←$ Zq; z′ = ay′ + x′ ∈ Zq
pk := (G, [a]1, ([zi]1)0≤i≤`, [z′]1)
sk := (skMAC, (yi)0≤i≤`, y′)
Return (pk, sk).
USKGen(sk, id):
t←$ Zq
u = x′ + t(x0 +
∑`
i=1 idi · xi)
v = y′ + t(y0 +
∑`
i=1 idi · yi)
Return usk[id] := ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2) ∈ G32
Enc(pk, id):
r ←$ Zq
c0 := (c0,0, c0,1) = (r, a · r)
c1 = r(z0 +
∑`
i=1 idizi)
K = z′ · r.
Return K = [K]T and C = ([c0]1, [c1]1) ∈ G31.
Dec(usk[id], id,C):
Parse usk[id] = ([t]2, [u]2, [v]2)
Parse C = ([c0]1, [c1]1)
K = e([c0,0]1, [v]2) · e([c0,1]1, [u]2)/e([c1]1, [t]2)
Return K ∈ GT .
IBKEM[MACNR[Dk],U1] is a “Cramer-Shoup variant" of Waters’ IBKEM Wat05 [28]. Concretely, Wat05
is a projected variant of our scheme and is obtained by setting usk[id] := ([t]2, [u + av]2) ∈ G22 and
C = ([c0 = c0,0 + ac0,1], [c1]) ∈ G21. Wat05 is IND-ID-CPA-secure under the CDH assumption, with a
non-tight security proofs. See [3] for a discussion on the impact of the non-tight reduction. Our IBKEM
is tightly IND-ID-CPA-secure and anonymous under the SXDH assumption.
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